



# **PolishAPI**

Specification of an interface for the needs of  
services provided by third parties on the basis of  
access to payment accounts

*Document developed by the PolishAPI Project Group*

12 December 2019  
**Version 3.0**

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## Version history

Version	Publication date	Change	Notes
3.0	12.12.2019	major	supported
2.1.3	12.07.2019	patch	supported
2.1.2	19.02.2019	patch	supported
2.1.1	06.12.2018	patch	supported
2.1	18.09.2018	minor	supported
2.0	09.07.2018	major	non supported
1.0	17.04.2018		non supported

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## Table of Contents

1	Glossary of Terms used in the Document .....	8
2	Introduction .....	10
2.1	Context .....	10
2.2	Document Structure .....	11
2.3	Mission of the PolishAPI Standard .....	11
2.4	Main Assumptions .....	12
2.4.1	Actors in the PolishAPI Standard-defined Processes.....	12
2.4.2	Requirements concerning Actors in the PolishAPI Standard-defined Processes .....	13
2.4.3	PSU Authentication Mechanisms .....	14
2.4.4	Management of PSU's Consents for the Performance of Services by a TPP.....	16
2.4.5	Application of the Strong Customer Authentication (SCA) Mechanism.....	17
2.4.6	Provision of Services within the Compliance Scope .....	17
2.4.7	Provision of Services within the Premium Scope .....	17
2.5	Development of the PolishAPI Standard .....	17
3	Business Definition of the Compliance Scope Services .....	18
3.1	Business Definition of the Compliance Scope for the PIS Service.....	18
3.1.1	Types of Transactions within the Compliance Scope .....	18
3.1.2	Transaction cancellation.....	19
3.1.3	Information about the Transaction Status .....	19
3.1.4	Definition of a Payment Account.....	20
3.1.5	List of Fields Required by the ASPSP in the Compliance Scope.....	20
3.1.6	Diagrams of requests under the PIS Service within the Compliance Scope.....	24
3.1.7	Authorisation of a payment transaction initiated by means of a PIS service.....	25
3.2	Business Definition of the Compliance Scope for the AIS Service .....	25
3.2.1	Definition of a Payment Account.....	25
3.2.2	Frequency of Requests within the Compliance Scope .....	25
3.2.3	Scope of Information concerning the Payment Account History within the Compliance Scope	26
3.2.4	List of Fields Required by the ASPSP in the Compliance Scope.....	26
3.2.5	Diagrams of Requests under the AIS Service within the Compliance Scope.....	33
3.3	Business Definition of the Compliance Scope for the CAF Service .....	33
3.3.1	List of Fields Required by the ASPSP in the Compliance Scope.....	33
3.3.2	Diagrams of Requests under the CAF Service within the Compliance Scope.....	33
4	Sample Use Cases .....	34
4.1	Use Case #1: payment initiation by the PISP (PIS) .....	34
4.1.1	Consent granting and payment initiation performance (single payment with a current or future date, recurring payments, multiple payments – transfer batch) – ASPSP-side authentication.....	34
4.1.2	Consent granting and payment initiation performance (single payment with a current or future date, recurring payments, multiple payments – transfer batch) – Authentication in an external authorization tool .....	35
4.1.3	Payment status request (single payment with a current or future date, recurring	

payment, multiple payment – transfer batch).....	36
4.1.4 Payment cancellation (single payment with a future date, recurring payment with a future date, single payment as part of a multiple payment (with a future date) or a multiple payment – a batch of transfers) – ASPSP-side authentication .....	37
4.1.5 Payment cancellation (single payment with a future date, recurring payment with a future date, single payment as part of a multiple payment (with a future date) or a multiple payment – a batch of transfers) – authentication in an external authorization tool .....	38
4.2 Use Case #2: payment account information display by the AISP (AIS) .....	39
4.2.1 Consent granting and account information taking with a manual insertion of the account number (ASPSP-side authentication) .....	39
4.2.2 Consent granting and account information taking with a manual insertion of the account number– authentication in an external authorization tool .....	40
4.2.3 Consent granting and account information taking with ASPSP-side account selection – ASPSP-side authentication .....	41
4.2.4 Consent granting and account information taking with an account list retrieval – ASPSP-side authentication .....	42
4.2.5 Consent granting and account information taking with an account list retrieval – authentication in an external authorization tool .....	43
4.2.6 Account information retrieval without PSU's participation .....	44
4.2.7 Withdrawal of consent .....	45
4.3 Use Case #3: request for confirmation of funds by a PIISP (CAF) .....	45
5 Polish API Technical Specification.....	47
5.1 Technical Assumptions .....	47
5.2 XS2A Session Establishment.....	48
5.3 Definition of Access Token .....	49
5.4 Mutual Authentication of the TPP and the ASPSP .....	49
5.5 Communication Protocol.....	50
5.6 Resource Name Diagram .....	50
5.7 Versioning.....	50
5.8 Canonical Data Model .....	51
5.9 Operations.....	51
5.10 Sorting .....	51
5.11 Filtering.....	51
5.12 Paging .....	51
5.13 Response Statuses.....	52
5.14 HTTP Header .....	53
5.15 Message format.....	53
5.16 Basic Data Formats .....	53
5.17 Unique Identifier of the request and an algorithm for its generation .....	54
6 Security of information .....	55
6.1 TPP's Authentication .....	55
6.2 TPP's Authorisation .....	55
6.3 PSU's Authorisation for Operations made by a TPP .....	55

6.4	Security in case of Mobile Apps .....	55
6.5	Data Validation and Integrity Assurance .....	56
6.6	Cryptography .....	56
6.6.1	Registration of TPP client applications on the ASPSP's side .....	57
6.6.2	Management of the JWS-SIGNATURE certificates .....	64
6.7	Protection against API Abuse .....	65
6.8	Audit Information Logging .....	65
7	Technical Description of the Authentication and Authorisation Process .....	66
7.1	Scope and scope_details Parameters .....	66
7.2	Redirection from the TPP to the ASPSP .....	67
7.2.1	PSU's authentication and authorisation .....	67
7.2.2	Reverse redirection of the PSU's browser to the TPP .....	67
7.2.3	Token collected on the basis of the <i>Authorization Code</i> .....	69
7.2.4	Consent Withdrawal .....	69
7.2.5	Use of the scope_details structure .....	69
7.3	Authentication Mechanism in an External Authorisation Tool (Decoupled) .....	69
7.4	Access token taking on the basis of the refresh token .....	71
7.5	New access token taking on the basis of the exchange token .....	72
8	Technical description of the PIS Service .....	74
8.1	Diagram of Activity in the PIS Service .....	74
8.2	XS2A Interface Request Structure .....	74
8.3	Structure of call back interface requests - Callback .....	75
9	Technical description of the AIS Service .....	76
9.1	Diagram of Activity in the AIS Service .....	76
9.2	XS2A Interface Request Structure .....	76
9.3	Structure of call back interface requests - Callback .....	77
10	Technical Description of the CAF Service .....	78
10.1	Diagram of Activity in the CAF Service .....	78
10.2	XS2A Interface Request Structure (including a description of fields and information if required) .....	78
11	Use of the XS2A interface methods and authorization services – sequence diagrams .....	79
11.1	Establishment of an XS2A session with the ASPSP-side PSU's authentication .....	80
11.2	XS2A session establishment with the PSU's authentication using an external authorization tool ( <i>decoupled</i> ) .....	83
11.3	Establishment of an XS2A session with the PSU's authentication using the <i>refresh token method</i> .....	86
11.4	Establishment of an XS2A session with the PSU's authentication using the <i>exchange token method</i> .....	86
11.5	XS2A Interface Method Calling with the Use of a Session .....	88

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11.6	XS2A Interface Method Calling without the Use of a Session .....	91
12	Error codes.....	93
13	Standard Implementation Recommendations .....	99
13.1	Timeout Support.....	99
13.2	TPP verification.....	99
13.3	Authorization server.....	99
13.4	Fraud Prevention.....	99
14	List of Annexes .....	100

## Table of Figures

Figure 1: General diagram of PolishAPI Standard communication .....	12
Figure 2: General diagram of dependencies between actors in the PolishAPI Standard .....	13
Figure 3: Authentication in an external authorization tool .....	15
Figure 4: Diagram of payment statuses .....	19
Figure 5: PIS – ASPSP-side authentication .....	35
Figure 6: PIS – authentication in an external authorization tool .....	36
Figure 7: PIS – status request.....	37
Figure 8: PIS – payment cancellation – ASPSP-side authentication.....	38
Figure 9: PIS – payment cancellation – authentication in an external authorization tool .....	39
Figure 10: AIS – manual insertion of the account number – ASPSP-side authentication.....	40
Figure 11: AIS – manual insertion of the account number– authentication in an external authorization tool.....	41
Figure 12: PIS – ASPSP-side account selection – ASPSP-side authentication .....	42
Figure 13: AIS – account list retrieval – ASPSP-side authentication .....	43
Figure 14: AIS – account list retrieval – authentication in an external authorization tool.....	44
Figure 15: AIS – Account information retrieval without PSU’s participation.....	45
Figure 16: AIS – consent withdrawal.....	45
Figure 17: CAF – request for confirmation of funds.....	46
Figure 18: Multilayer XS2A session establishment diagram .....	49
Figure 19: Authentication Mechanism on the ASPSP’s Side .....	67
Figure 20: High-level diagram of activity in the PIS Service .....	74
Figure 21: High-level diagram of activity in the AIS Service.....	76
Figure 22: High-level diagram of activity in the CAF Service.....	78
Figure 23: Establishment of an XS2A session – ASPSP-side authentication method.....	80
Figure 24: Establishment of an XS2A session – authentication in an external authorization tool 83	
Figure 25: XS2A session establishment – refresh token .....	86
Figure 26: XS2A session establishment – exchange token .....	87
Figure 27: XS2A interface method calling with the use of a session .....	89
Figure 28: XS2A interface method calling without the use of a session.....	91

# 1 Glossary of Terms used in the Document

**Account Information Service (AIS)** – as defined in Art. 66 of PSD2.

**Account Information Service Provider (AISP)** – TPPs using the XS2A interface to access information about the PSU's payment account.

**Confirmation of the Availability of Funds (CAF)** – a service defined in Art. 65 of PSD2.

**External Authorization Tool (EAT)** – a system providing the SCA procedure, i.e. the strong authentication of PSU.

**European Banking Authority (EBA)** – the European Banking Authority.

**ETSI** – European Telecommunication Standardisation Institute.

**OAuth2** – OAuth2 is an open authorisation standard. It allows users to share their private resources (e.g. pictures, films, contacts) stored at a given site with another party without a necessity to fathom the complexities of authorisation, usually providing the user name and a token (one-time passwords).

**Payment Initiation Service Provider (PISP)** – TPPs using the XS2A interface to initiate the a payment transaction debited to the PSU's account.

**Payment Initiation Services (PIS)** – as defined in Art. 67 of PSD2.

**Payment Instrument Issuer Service Provider (PIISP)** – TPPs using the XS2A interface to confirm the availability at the PSU's payment account of an amount necessary to effect the payment transaction performed on the basis of an instrument issued by the PIISP.

**Payment Services Directive (PSD)** – Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on payment services in the internal market.

**Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2)** – Directive 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council on payment services in the internal market and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC.

**Payment Services User (PSU)** – natural or legal person making use of a payment service in the capacity of either payer or payee, or both.

**Payment account** – an account held in the name of one or more payment service users which is used for the execution of payment transactions.

**VAT account** – an account with limited functionality, associated with a payment account.

**Regulatory Technical Standard (RTS)** – Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 2018/389 of 27 November 2017 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication.

**Revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2)** – Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market (revised payment services directive).

**Strong Customer Authentication (SCA)** - means an authentication based on the use of two or more elements (components) categorised as knowledge (something only the user knows), possession (something only the user possesses) and inherence (something the user is) that are independent, in that the breach of one does not compromise the reliability of the others, and is designed in such a way as to protect the confidentiality of the authentication data.



**Swagger** – is an open source software which helps design, build, document and consume the RESTful Web services.

**TS 119 495** – a technical specification of the standard concerning the qualified certificate profile for the needs of the Payment Services Directive (Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Sector Specific Requirements; Qualified Certificate Profiles and TSP Policy Requirements under the Payment Services Directive 2015/2366/EU), updated as at the date of publication of this standard.

**Granting Consent** – a process in result of which the PSU grants TPP consent to access his/her account held by the ASPSP in order to effect a service, including the AIS, PIS and CAF services.

**Authentication** – a process in result of which the ASPSP verifies the PSU's identity.

**Payment Services Act** – Polish Payment Services Act of 19 August 2011.

**XS2A (Access to Account)** – access to payment accounts used to perform AIS, PIS, CAF and other services effected as part of the PolishAPI.

**Premium Scope** of the AIS, PIS and CAF services – services exceeding the requirements laid down in PSD2.

**Compliance Scope** of the AIS, PIS and CAF services – services required by PSD2.

## 2 Introduction

### 2.1 Context

The implementation by the European Union of the new directive on payment services in the internal market (PSD2) introduces a possibility to offer new products and services related not only to the payment service market but also the financial service market in the wider sense. Both the entities present on the market, such as banks, cooperative savings and credit unions (SKOK) or branches of foreign credit institutions, as well as new types of entities (third party providers - TPP) will be able to take advantage of the possibility to offer new services built on the basis of the PSD2 Directive, the implementing acts (including the regulatory technical standards - RTS) and national acts of law. The new categories of services are:

- a) **Account Information Service (AIS)** – as defined in Art. 67 of PSD2
- b) **Payment Initiation Service (PIS)** – as defined in Art. 66 of PSD2
- c) **Confirmation of the Availability of Funds (CAF)** – as defined in Art. 65 of PSD2

Allowing the performance of the above-mentioned services by entities authorised to do so required the preparation by account servicing payment service providers (ASPSP) of dedicated interfaces allowing access to payment accounts (the XS2A interface) by authorised third party providers (TPP), based on an open API.

Banks and other entities cooperating with the Polish Bank Association took a decision on the creation of a common and universal API standard drawing on the existing achievements of the Polish banking and payment sectors, the best practices and experiences, including those resulting from foreign API standards, as well as the existing interfaces of the interbanking infrastructure. Banks and other ASPSP will be able to implement the standard, depending on the business decisions they take independently. During the work of the business, IT, security and legal task forces, assumptions were formulated and then the standard description was created as presented herein below.

The basis assumed for this standard version was the Delegated Regulation with regard to regulatory technical standards for strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication (RTS), as published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 13 March 2018 ([https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L\\_.2018.069.01.0023.01.POL&toc=OJ:L:2018:069:TOC](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2018.069.01.0023.01.POL&toc=OJ:L:2018:069:TOC)).

The following entities took part in the preparation of this standard (in an alphabetical order):

- 1) Allegro Group
- 2) Biuro Informacji Kredytowej S.A.
- 3) Billbird S.A.
- 4) Blue Media S.A.
- 5) Diners Club Polska
- 6) Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A.
- 7) Kontomierz.pl Sp. z o.o.
- 8) National Savings and Credit Union
- 9) Polish Association of Cooperative Banks
- 10) PayU S.A.
- 11) Polish Chamber of Information Technology and Telecommunications (PIIT)
- 12) Polish Insurance Association (PIU)
- 13) Polski Standard Płatności Sp. z o.o.
- 14) Polish Organisation of Non-banking Payment Institutions (PONIP)
- 15) Skycash Poland S.A.
- 16) F. Stefczyk Cooperative Savings and Credit Union



## 17) Polish Bank Association together with its associated bank members<sup>1</sup>

The specification draft was subject to public consultation (between 17-31 January 2018), in result of which 21 Polish and foreign entities submitted approx. 300 comments and observations, partially allowed for in this document.

## 2.2 Document Structure

The document consists of two fundamental parts and of annexes:

- a) Part concerning the business characteristics of the PolishAPI Standard (Chapters [2 – 4](#))
- b) Part concerning the technological solutions adopted in the PolishAPI Standard (Chapters [0 – 13](#))
- c) Annexes, the list of which is given in Chapter [14](#)

## 2.3 Mission of the PolishAPI Standard

The main objective of this document is to define interfaces for services described in PSD2 and related acts of law as regards the interactions between ASPSPs and TPPs during the performance of the AIS, PIS and CAF services. The requirement of open APIs also provides a chance that ASPSPs and TPPs will obtain an opportunity under a single standard to offer not only law-required services but also additional services the scope of which exceeds the framework defined by the legislator. Therefore, the following scopes of services can be identified within the PolishAPI standard:

- a) **Compliance Scope** of the AIS, PIS and CAF services - services required by PSD2,
- b) **Premium Scope** of the AIS, PIS and CAF services - services exceeding the requirements laid down in PSD2, outside the scope of this document.

Each ASPSP and TPP may use the PolishAPI standard as an open standard. The application of the standard is not mandatory. Each of the entities operating on the market on the basis of the PSD2 Directive may use any solution compliant with PSD2 and the related acts of law.

The interactions between the TPPs and PSUs and between ASPSPs and PSUs, as well as the matters related to the processes of making an entry in the national register of TPPs, and of granting of authorisations for the operation of TPPs in the scope related to PSD2-related services by public administration authorities are outside the scope of this document.

A part of the problems remaining within the standard specification scope will be systematically added over time as the project and agreement work (including public consultation) will advance. The above reservation concerns, without limitation, the problems related to specific functionalities of business and corporate accounts (e.g. a multi-signature).

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
<sup>1</sup> Alior Bank S.A., Bank BGŻ BNP Paribas S.A., Bank Handlowy w Warszawie S.A., Bank Millennium S.A., Bank Pekao S.A., Bank Pocztowy S.A., Bank Polskiej Spółdzielczości S.A., Bank Zachodni WBK S.A., Credit Agricole Bank Polska S.A., Deutsche Bank Polska S.A., DNB Bank Polska S.A., Eurobank S.A., Getin Noble Bank S.A., Idea Bank S.A., ING Bank Śląski S.A., mBank S.A., Nest Bank S.A., PKO Bank Polski S.A., Raiffeisen Bank Polska S.A., SGB-Bank S.A.

## 2.4 Main Assumptions

### 2.4.1 Actors in the PolishAPI Standard-defined Processes

The standard defined only three categories of actors that can take part in processes defined by the PolishAPI standard:

- a) **Payment Service User (PSU)** – User of the payment account the given payment transaction refers to
- b) **Account Servicing Payment Service Provider (ASPSP)** – Provides maintaining the payment account and making the XS2A interface available for TPPs
- c) **Third Party Provider (TPP)** – Entity using the XS2A interface on the basis of and in accordance with the consents granted by the PSUs. The ASPSP may also act as a TPP and use the interfaces made available by other ASPSPs



*Figure 1: General diagram of PolishAPI Standard communication*

The standard defined three roles which the actors taking part in the PolishAPI standard-defined processes can play. The categorisation below does not restrict the entities acting as TPPs to apply for an entry in the national register in more than a single role but aims at defining the roles of particular actors in the description of communication under the PolishAPI standard.

- a) **Account Information Service Provider (AISP)** – TPPs using the XS2A interface to access information about the PSU's payment account.
- b) **Payment Initiation Service Provider (PISP)** – TPPs using the XS2A interface to initiate the a payment transaction debited to the PSU's account.
- c) **Payment Instrument Issuer Service Provider (PIISP)** – TPPs using the XS2A interface to confirm the availability at the PSU's payment account of an amount necessary to effect the payment transaction performed on the basis of an instrument issued by the PIISP.

The actors may play the following roles:

Actor \ Role	PSU	ASPSP	TPP
AISP	NO	YES	YES
PISP	NO	YES	YES
PIISP	NO	YES	YES




Figure 2: General diagram of dependencies between actors in the PolishAPI Standard

## 2.4.2 Requirements concerning Actors in the PolishAPI Standard-defined Processes

- The ASPSP must implement an XS2A interface compliant with the PolishAPI standard. The ASPSP may also implement other XS2A interface standards, which however will not be covered by the scope of this document
- The interfaces implemented by ASPSPs must be compliant with PSD2, the Payment Services Act and related acts, in particular the RTSs
- The TPP must be registered in at least one register of the European Union Member State in the role it intends to play during the PolishAPI standard-based communication
- The TPP and ASPSP must have a valid certificate used for mutual identification in the XS2A interface obtained from a qualified provider of trust services and meeting the regulatory requirements concerning the electronic identification and trust services. The certificate should

additionally meet the requirements defined in the RTSs and in the ETSI technical specification (TS 119 495).

- e) PSU may be present in the context of an account for individual clients and in the context of an account for corporate (business) clients. The context of an account for an individual client is the default one. For calls in the context of an account for a corporate client, there must be the 'isCompanyContext' tag sent with the value of 'true' in the body of the request sent as per the technical specification.
- f) Additional parameters allowing the narrowing down of the business scope of information returned by the XS2A interface are the following:
  - psuIdentifierType – type of PSU's identifier (the available range of identifiers may be different for each ASPSP and must be defined by it - in the form of a dictionary of values - in a detailed XS2A interface specification). The value of this parameter is used to indicate the information on the basis of which the PSU to be authenticated will be identified. The parameter is not required.
  - psuIdentifierValue – value of PSU's identifier. The parameter is required only in case a non-empty value of the psuIdentifierType parameter is produced.
  - psuContextIdentifierType – Type of identifier of the context in which the PSU is present. (the available range of identifiers may be different for each ASPSP and must be defined by it - in the form of a dictionary of values - in a detailed XS2A interface specification). The parameter is required conditionally - in case a request is sent to such a PSU that may be present in more than one context in the ASPSP selected,
  - psuContextIdentifierValue – value of identifier of the context in which the PSU is present. The parameter is required conditionally - in case a non-empty value of the psuContextIdentifierType is produced. The said parameters are used to indicate a more detailed context of the XS2A interface method calling. The parameters should be used, for example, in case of such a PSU, who is at the same time a proxy to accounts of many clients with the given ASPSP.

### 2.4.3 PSU Authentication Mechanisms


The PolishAPI Standard allows the PSU authentication mechanisms as listed below. The ASPSP may freely select the authentication method. The selection made should be compliant with the regulations in force.

#### 2.4.3.1 Authentication Mechanism on the ASPSP's Side

The PolishAPI Standard allows the use of a mechanism of ASPSP-side authentication, which assumes a redirection to the ASPSP's website during the execution of the AIS, PIS and CAF services. This means that the PSU's authentication and authorisation data are given exclusively at the ASPSP's website. The PSU is authenticated in the ASPSP's interface.

#### 2.4.3.2 Authentication Mechanism in an External Authorisation Tool (Decoupled)

The PolishAPI Standard allows the use of an authentication mechanism using an external authorization tool during the performance of the AIS and PIS services. The mechanism of authentication in an external authorisation tool has been presented at a high level in the diagram below. Details concerning its use have been described in chapter [7.3](#).



**Figure 3: Authentication in an external authorization tool**

The following assumptions have been made:

- ASPSP cooperates with the provider of an external authorization tool (hereinafter referred to as EAT).
- PSU holds an account with EAT and has taken steps necessary to use the code generator function.
- ASPSP prepares a message containing basic information about the transaction displayed in EAT before confirmation.

#### 2.4.3.2.1 Code acquisition from EAT:

- 001 / In order to obtain an EAT code, PSU logs into a dedicated tool compliant with PSD2 and with ASPSP's safety requirements.
- 002 / EAT supports PSU's logging in and generates an EAT code.
- 003 / EAT displays the code to PSU.
- 004 / PSU acquires the EAT code generated.

#### 2.4.3.2.2 PSU's authentication using EAT:

- 101 / PSU inserts the EAT code in the instruction form at TPP's.
- 102 / TPP forwards the request to start a session with XS2A and to send the EAT code to ASPSP.
- 103 / ASPSP verifies TPP, there is, inter alia, a verification of TPP's certificate.
- 104 / ASPSP initiates the EAT code verification and provides information concerning the use of a 2nd factor by EAT and basic information about the transaction.
- 105 / EAT verifies the code.
- 106 / EAT displays to the user the information about the transaction in process (agreed details) – optionally, in this step the user determines the source account (PIS) or an account/accounts covered by the consent (AIS), if this has not been defined by the TPP in the API call.
- 107 / EAT performs authentication – the 2nd factor is used as per ASPSP's request.
- 108 / EAT sends information to ASPSP about a correctly identified EAT code.

- 109 / ASPSP provides the *authorization code* and the result of PSU's authentication to TPP.
- 110 / TPP starts a session with XS2A using the *authorization code*.
- 111 / ASPSP establishes a session and provides an *access token* to TPP.
- 112 / TPP recalls the XS2A interface service using the *access token*.

### 2.4.3.3 Other Authentication Mechanisms

The standard may contain a description of other mechanisms of authentication which meet the regulatory requirements and requirements agreed during the work of the project group. They will be published in subsequent versions of this document.

## 2.4.4 Management of PSU's Consents for the Performance of Services by a TPP

Pursuant to PSD2, the TPP may perform services for a PSU only upon his/her consent and within the scope covered by such consent. The PolishAPI standard defines the framework of consent grant and revocation by PSUs.

### 2.4.4.1 Process of Granting Consent by PSU to Effect the PIS Service

It is assumed that the payment initiation process (with the current date, future date, recurring payments and multiple payments, as described in Chapter [3.1.1](#)) performed is each time related with the consent expressed for this purpose by the PSU in the TPP's interface. The processes of consent granting, payment initiation and payment status retrieval in obligatory variants assuming a TPP-side manual insertion of the account number and the ASPSP-side account selection as well as the payment cancellation have been presented in the diagrams and in the descriptions in [Chapter 4](#).

### 2.4.4.2 Process of Granting Consent by PSU to Effect the AIS Service

In this Chapter, the term 'consent' refers exclusively to the provision of the AIS service and means the grant of consent for the service without indicating specific accounts (in case of an option with the ASPSP-side account indication or with a retrieval of a list of accounts) or with an indication of the same (in case of an option with a manual account number insertion). This process is always linked with the strong customer authentication (SCA).

Determination of access parameters (in case of an option with the ASPSP-side account indication or with a retrieval of a list of accounts) means each operation on specific accounts within the limits of the consent to effect the AIS services, including:

- indication of a specific account
- change of parameters for a specific account (e.g. date of access)
- withdrawal of indication of a specific account or
- withdrawal of consent

These operations do not require the strong customer authentication (SCA).

The standard allows three processes of granting a consent for the AIS service (in options allowing the authentication on the ASPSP's side and in an external authorisation tool):

- with a manual insertion of the account (accounts) number
- with the ASPSP-side account (accounts) number selection (only in the option with the ASPSP-side authentication)
- with the account list retrieval. This process is an optional process and its implementation depends on the ASPSP's decision.



The processes of consent granting and account information retrieval in the above-mentioned variants have been presented in the diagrams and descriptions in [Chapter 4](#).

#### **2.4.4.3 Process of Granting Consent by PSU to Effect the CAF Service**

The process of the PSU's granting a consent for the ASPSP to effect the CAF service will be developed in the next version of this document. For the purposes of the current version, it is assumed that the request within the CAF service is made exclusively in the situation when the consent has been made previously. The fund availability request process has been presented at the diagram and in the description in [Chapter 4](#).

#### **2.4.5 Application of the Strong Customer Authentication (SCA) Mechanism**

ASPSPs use any given strong PSU authentication system (SCA) they selected and the PolishAPI standard does not define and does not recommend any way in which this procedure may be conducted. Furthermore, the decision to release a given transaction from the SCA procedure remains in the exclusive competence of the ASPSP.

#### **2.4.6 Provision of Services within the Compliance Scope**

Each ASPSP is obliged to make available the services from the Compliance Scope pursuant to PSD2 and the related acts of law. ASPSP makes the accounts available in accordance with the definition given in [Chapter 3.2.1](#) and takes independent decisions as to the scope of payment account data available online within the framework of this service. The performance of services within the Compliance Scope will not require a contractual relation between the ASPSP and the TPP.

#### **2.4.7 Provision of Services within the Premium Scope**

Each ASPSP takes the decisions on making available the services within the Premium Scope and, in case of a decision to start offering them, determines the extent of such services independently. The performance of services within the Premium Scope will require a contractual relation between the ASPSP and the TPP.

### **2.5 Development of the PolishAPI Standard**

Currently, the PolishAPI standard defines the Compliance Scope of the AIS, PIS and CAF services. A permanent development of the standard in response to regulatory, technological and business changes on the Polish and European market is assumed. The changes will be published as subsequent versions of the PolishAPI standard specification.

## 3 Business Definition of the Compliance Scope Services

### 3.1 Business Definition of the Compliance Scope for the PIS Service

The Payment transaction initiation service within the Compliance Scope consists in making available by the ASPSP of a possibility to initiate a payment from the payment account by the PSU via a TPP who acts as a PISP after obtaining prior consent from the PSU as appropriate.

#### 3.1.1 Types of Transactions within the Compliance Scope

As part of the PIS service within the Compliance Scope, the ASPSP will make available to the PSU, via the TPP (PISP), an initiation of payments that meet the following cumulative conditions:

- a) The payment is a bank transfer
- b) The payment is a single transfer, a recurring transfer (a series of transfers), understood as a definition of such a transfer or a multiple payment (transfer batch), whereby a batch of transfers may be made up exclusively of transfers of the same type from a single account number (e.g. exclusively domestic transfers or exclusively EEA transfers)
- c) The payment is a transfer with a current date or a future date
- d) If it is a domestic transfer, it is settled using one of the following systems (depending on which of the systems is supported by the ASPSP):
  - a. Elixir,
  - b. Express Elixir,
  - c. SORBNET2,
  - d. Blue Cash.
- e) If the payment is a foreign transfer, it is settled in one of the systems listed below:
  - a. SWIFT
  - b. SEPA
  - c. TARGET
- f) It is available in the online interface of the given ASPSP
- g) The PSU will complete all the data required to order a transfer (the ASPSP will not provide support in the form of dictionaries, dropdown lists or other creators) or, in case of a process allowing for the ASPSP-side account selection, all the data save the number of the account from which the payment will be initiated

A multiple transfer (transfer batch) may be made in the following two ways:

- a) the PSU defines *n* transfers at the TPP's interface side, then the strong authentication procedure is effected, during which all the payments defined are confirmed at the same time,
- b) The PSU uploads a structured file where any given structure supported by the ASPSP will be placed. A transfer of such a file is related to the strong authentication procedure (a business description and the API method for this process variant will be added in the subsequent version of the specification).

It is also possible to initiate a split payment, i.e. a payment in which the payment amount is transferred to two recipient's accounts (current account and VAT account).

The data given by the TPP in the transfer order should not be modified by the PSU in the ASPSP's domain. Each ASPSP is obliged to make available the services from the Compliance Scope pursuant to PSD2 and the related acts of law. The ASPSP takes an independent decision about the scope of online services provided and the data concerning the payment accounts available under the service, also on the basis of the availability of particular services in the online banking of the given ASPSP. The performance of services within the Compliance Scope will not require a contractual relation between the ASPSP and the TPP.

### 3.1.2 Transaction cancellation

The following may be cancelled:

- single payments with a future date with the 'scheduled' status,
- recurring payments (definition of payments),
- single payments with a future date defined as part of a multiple payment (batch of transfers), with the 'scheduled' status.

Provided the ASPSP offers such a functionality, it is also possible to cancel a multiple payment (batch of transfers) as a whole, subject to a reservation that if at the moment of cancellation the batch comprises transfers that have already been done, such cancellation does not have any impact on the same and the cancellation concerns only payments with a future date.

### 3.1.3 Information about the Transaction Status

As part of the message exchange in the PIS service within the Compliance Scope, the ASPSP will immediately advise the TPP about the order acceptance or rejection. Additionally, the TPP will be able to retrieve information about the payment status using the `getPayment` method with an option to enquire about the status of many payments (`getMultiplePayments`), provided the ASPSP offers such a functionality. The ASPSP will have an optional possibility to transfer (asynchronously) to the TPP the information about the payment status using the `/accounts/{version}/paymentCallBack` and the recurring payment definition status `/accounts/{version}/recurringPaymentCallBack` method.

The following statuses are defined:

- Submitted
- Scheduled
- Cancelled
- Pending
- Rejected
- Done




Figure 4: Diagram of payment statuses

Multiple payments (batches of transfers) have the following statuses:

- inProgress – contain at least one transaction with a future date;
- partiallyDone – contain at least one transaction with a Done status;

- c) cancelled;
- d) done – all transactions of the bundle have the Done status

The definition of a recurring payment has the following statuses:

- a) The definition of a recurring payment (a standing order) has been correctly sent and accepted on the ASPSP's side (*submitted*)
- b) The recurring payment (standing order) is defined correctly and is executed as per the time schedule (final date in the future or indefinitely) (*in progres*)
- c) The definition of a recurring payment (standing order) has been deleted and is not executed (*cancelled*)
- d) The definition of a recurring payment (standing order) had a final date that expired and is no longer executed (*closed*).

### 3.1.4 Definition of a Payment Account

This service is provided only for payment accounts to which the given PSU has an on-line access. The account must meet all of the following cumulative conditions:

- a) It is an account held for one or more users which is used to effect payment transactions (as per the definition laid down in the PSA).
- b) The PSU has an on-line access to the account.

### 3.1.5 List of Fields Required by the ASPSP in the Compliance Scope

In order to initiate the PIS service payment transaction within the Compliance Scope correctly, the ASPSP may request from the PSU, via the TPP (PISP), that the following fields be completed with transaction order data. Each ASPSP may expect the PSU to transfer another set of data via the TPP.

With reference to foreign transfers, the use of certain fields will be optional, depending on the functionalities supported by the given ASPSPs. The ASPSP will effect the payments on condition that the payment will be initiated as appropriate by the TPP, i.e. appropriate fields with appropriate content are submitted.

Mandatory fields defining the TPP:

- a) TPP's name

#### 3.1.5.1 National transfer

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Address of the transfer payee	No	
Effective date of the transfer	No	For the future effective date of the transfer, the urgency mode refers to that date
Transfer amount	Yes	
Name of the transfer sender	No	Sender's name completed by the ASPSP in order to avoid a situation when the transfer order coming from the ASPSP contains data other than data of the holder of the account debited.
Name of the transfer payee	Yes	
Transfer sender's account number	Yes	Given by the TPP or selected by the PSU after redirection to the ASPSP.
Transfer payee's account number	Yes	

Transfer description field	Yes	
Urgency mode	Yes	ExpressD0, StandardD1
Transfer type (system)	Yes	In case of a domestic transfer: Elixir, ExpressElixir, Sorbnet, BlueCash, Internal
Currency	No	In case the field is empty, the ASPSP will make the transfer in the account currency.
Block	No	Bool type field, owing to which the client will be able to make an explicit wish to make a block (in case of, e.g. a payment order on a free day). A default behaviour in case the parameter is not provided is defined by ASPSP.
Transaction ID as assigned by the TPP	Yes	
Transfer execution mode	Yes	What mode the transfer will be made in. As per the possibilities described in the following dictionary: - Immediate - Future date
Is payment using the Split Payment mechanism	No	Value determining whether the transfer is initiated using the Split Payment mechanism. The default value is false
Invoice number	Conditionally	Invoice number that the transfer relates to. Required when the Split Payment mechanism is used.
Transfer recipient's ID	Conditionally	For example, tax identification number. Required when the Split Payment mechanism is used.
VAT amount	Conditionally	Required when the Split Payment mechanism is used.
Additional description	No	

### 3.1.5.2 Domestic transfers to tax authorities / customs authorities in Poland

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Address of the transfer payee	Yes	
Data of the authorities		
Effective date of the transfer	No	For the future effective date of the transfer, the urgency mode refers to that date
Payer's ID	Yes	
Payer's ID type	Yes	Dictionary: N - NIP, P - PESEL, R - REGON, 1 – ID card number, 2 – Passport number, 3 - Other
Liability ID	No	
Transfer amount	Yes	
Name of payer	No	Sender's name completed by the ASPSP in order to avoid a situation when the transfer order coming from the ASPSP contains data other than data of the holder of the account debited.
Period number	Yes	

Transfer sender's account number	Yes	Given by the TPP or selected by the PSU after redirection to the ASPSP.
Transfer payee's account number	Yes	
Form symbol	Yes	
Period type	Yes	
Urgency mode	Yes	ExpressD0, StandardD1
Transfer type (system)	Yes	Standard (Elixir), express (ExpressElixir)
Currency	Yes	
Block	No	Bool type field, owing to which the client will be able to make an explicit wish to make a block (in case of, e.g. a payment order on a free day). A default behaviour in case the parameter is not provided is defined by ASPSP.
Transaction ID as assigned by the TPP	Yes	
Transfer execution mode	Yes	What mode the transfer will be made in. As per the possibilities described in the following dictionary: - Immediate - Future date

### 3.1.5.3 EEA foreign transfer

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Address of the transfer payee	No	
Effective date of the transfer	No	For the future effective date of the transfer, the urgency mode refers to that date
Transfer amount	Yes	
Name of the transfer sender	No	Sender's name completed by the ASPSP in order to avoid a situation when the transfer order coming from the ASPSP contains data other than data of the holder of the account debited.
Name of the transfer payee	Yes	
Transfer sender's account number	Yes	Given by the TPP or selected by the PSU after redirection to the ASPSP.
Transfer payee's account number	Yes	
Transfer payee's country code	Yes	As per ISO 3166-1 alfa-3
Transfer description field	Yes	
Urgency mode	Yes	Standard, express
Transfer type (system)	No	SEPA, Instant SEPA, Target
Currency	No	Constant value - EUR
Block	No	Bool type field, owing to which the client will be able to make an explicit wish to make a block (in case of, e.g. a payment order on a free day). A default behaviour in case the parameter is not provided is defined by ASPSP.
Transaction ID as assigned by the TPP	Yes	

Transfer execution mode	Yes	What mode the transfer will be made in. As per the possibilities described in the following dictionary: - Immediate - Future date
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### 3.1.5.4 Foreign transfer other than EEA

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Effective date of the transfer	No	For the future effective date of the transfer, the urgency mode (of the transfer) refers to that date
Transfer sender's account number	Yes	Given by the TPP or selected by the PSU after redirection to the ASPSP.
Transfer payee's account number	Yes	
Name of the transfer sender	No	Sender's name completed by the ASPSP in order to avoid a situation when the transfer order coming from the ASPSP contains data other than data of the holder of the account debited.
Name of the transfer payee	Yes	
Address of the transfer payee	No	
Transfer payee's country code	Yes	As per ISO 3166-1 alfa-3
Transfer description field	Yes	
Transfer amount	Yes	
Currency	Yes	
BIC/SWIFT of the payee's bank	No	Conditional fields – required depending on the final specification of the Bank implementing the PolishAPI standard
Country of the payee's bank	No	
Name of the payee's bank	No	
Address of the payee's bank	No	
Code of the payee's bank	No	
Cost clause	No	
Urgency mode	Yes	Standard, urgent, express
Transfer type (system)	No	SWIFT
Block	No	Bool type field, owing to which the client will be able to make an explicit wish to make a block (in case of, e.g. a payment order on a free day). A default behaviour in case the parameter is not provided is defined by ASPSP.
Transaction ID as assigned by the TPP	Yes	
Transfer execution mode	Yes	What mode the transfer will be made in. As per the possibilities described in the following dictionary: - Immediate - Future date

The ASPSP may, for the authorization of transfers the necessary parameters of which were not stipulated in the table above, define and document a set of such additional parameters. The parameters should be optional (and, if possible, should have a default value specified) for all the transfers the execution of which is possible without their specification (i.e. for countries where the accounts may be addressed correctly using the fields from the table above). The interpretation of the above additional parameters may not lead to any contradiction with the published meaning of the parameters defined in the standard.

### 3.1.5.5 Recurring payment (standing order)

Each payment type may be defined as a recurring payment (standing order), assuming that it is to be effected in favour of the same beneficiary and in the same amount. In that case, apart from the data defined in the chapters above, it will be necessary to specify the following data:

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Start date (Date when the first payment is to be executed)	Yes	Data of execution of the first payment in the cycle defined
Frequency	Yes	Defines how often a recurring transfer is to be executed.
periodType	Yes	Type of time period unit
periodValue	Yes	Value of the time period unit
End date (Latest possible transfer date)	No	Defines the latest possible date when a recurring transfer can be executed.
Execution on a bank holiday	Yes	Defines the behaviour in case the transfer date is a bank holiday, possible values are: 'before' and 'after' the bank holiday.

### 3.1.5.6 Cancellation of an initiated payment

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Payment identifier	Conditionally	Required for a single payment cancellation request
Identifier of a batch of transfers	Conditionally	Required for a batch of transfers cancellation request

### 3.1.5.7 Cancellation of a recurring payment definition

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Recurring payment identifier	Yes	Recurring payment identifier assigned by the ASPSP

## 3.1.6 Diagrams of requests under the PIS Service within the Compliance Scope

The diagrams have been presented in Use Case #1 in Chapter 4.





### 3.1.7 Authorisation of a payment transaction initiated by means of a PIS service

The ASPSP provides a possibility to authorise a payment transaction ordered by the PSU under a payment initiation service within the understanding of the Payment Services Act (PSA), irrespective of the authorisation method and its complexity. The authorisation method is selected by the ASPSP.

## 3.2 Business Definition of the Compliance Scope for the AIS Service

The account information service within the Compliance Scope consists in making available by the ASPSP of data concerning the transaction history and selected information about the payment account to which the PSU has an active on-line access. The access is granted to a TPP acting as an AISP after a prior acquisition of consent as appropriate from the PSU. Additionally, the ASPSP makes available its data filtering mechanisms in accordance with the criteria available on-line in the ASPSP system (i.e. via the electronic banking), e.g.:

- a) The transaction booking date (as per the indicated specific booking date and within the specified range of dates)
- b) The transaction amount
- c) The payment account debits and credits

### 3.2.1 Definition of a Payment Account

This service is provided only for payment accounts to which the given PSU has an on-line access. The account must meet all of the following cumulative conditions:

- c) It is an account held for one or more users which is used to effect payment transactions (as per the definition laid down in the PSA).
- d) The PSU has an on-line access to the account.

### 3.2.2 Frequency of Requests within the Compliance Scope

As part of the AIS service within the Compliance Scope, the TPP (AISP) may request that the ASPSP sent a payment account history and selected information about the payment account:

- a) Up to 4 times within a 24 hour time span from the first request in case when the data collection is not initiated at the PSU's request via the TPP (AISP), but by TPP (AISP) on the basis of consent provided earlier by the PSU;
- b) In each instance when the request is initiated directly by PSU via the intermediation of the TPP (AISP).

If a request that have not been initiated at the PSU's request, contains result paging, it should be treated as a single request. The functionality of request counting over the time interval set remains at the discretion of the ASPSP at the implementation level, whereby one should allow for the business logic of the request which may be executed by calling a few interface methods (e.g. a request for account transaction history is related with the calling of the following methods: `getTransactionsDone`, `getTransactionsPending`, `getTransactionsScheduled`, `getTransactionsCancelled`, `getHolds` and `getTransactionDetail` – the calling of all the interface methods mentioned should be treated as a single request.

A higher frequency of requests in case when the data collection is not initiated at the PSU's request via the TPP (AISP) but by the TPP (AISP) on basis of consent expressed earlier by the PSU may be allowed with regard to the AIS service only in the Premium Scope and is subject to separate bilateral arrangements by and between the ASPSP and the TPP (AISP).

### 3.2.3 Scope of Information concerning the Payment Account History within the Compliance Scope

Within the Compliance Scope, the AIS service comprises the provision to the PSU, together with data filtering mechanisms (including transaction history date scopes), of all available on-line account history of transactions booked, pending and rejected at the given payment account and blocked funds, which are visible to the PSU in the APSPS's on-line channel. Whereby, a pending transaction means a transaction that is not booked, not modifiable and which influences the available funds (available balance); a scheduled operation means a payment ordered with a future date. Pursuant to the regulations, the provision of the account history is related to the SCA process always (irrespective of the exclusions from the SCA application obligation applied), when the client obtains an online account access for the first time and when the request concerns a history of 90+ days. The SCA may be abandoned if the request concerns a history of payment transactions effected within the last 90 days, on condition that no more than 90 days have lapsed since the access to a history of not more than 90 days was obtained and the SCA was applied. The strong re-authentication of the PSU after the expiry of the 90-day period following the previous strong authentication, if the service scope has not changed, is carried out using the consentid, without a necessity to resubmit the account access parameters as defined earlier by the PSU. The TPP may initiate this process before the expiry of the 90-day period, extending thus the period during which the PSU will have access to the data without a necessity of a strong authentication.

### 3.2.4 List of Fields Required by the ASPSP in the Compliance Scope

In response to the requests sent by the TPP (AISP), the ASPSP sends responses concerning the following fields, as arranged by the interface methods.

/getAccount

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENT
Account number	YES	
Account type	NO	Dictionary value
Account type name	NO	ASPSP-defined
Type of account holder	YES	Natural person or legal person
Account name	NO	Client-set
Account currency	YES	
Available funds	YES	
Book balance of the account	YES	
Bank's BIC/SWIFT	NO	
Bank's name	NO	
PSU's Name Surname or Business Name	NO	
Type of relation between PSU and an Account	YES	Dictionary value
Type of relation between PSU and an Account	NO	Dictionary value
VAT account number	No	A number that is associated with a given current/deposit account
Numbers of current/deposit accounts	No	List of all numbers of current/deposit accounts that are associated with a given VAT account

/getTransactionsDone

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENT
Element ID	YES	Transaction or hold ID assigned by the ASPSP
The transaction amount	YES	
Currency of transaction	NO	ISO code of the transaction currency
Transaction title	YES	
Operation Date	NO	
MCC code	NO	Merchant Category Code for each transaction/operation made using a card
Transaction type	NO	
Transaction category	YES	credit/debit
Transaction status	NO	Dictionary value
Originator's data	NO	In case of transactions originated by people other than the account holder, name and address
Sender's account number	NO	
Sender's virtual account number	NO	IBAN format
BIC/SWIFT of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's country	NO	For foreign transfers only
Address of the sender's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Sender's data	NO	Name and address
Payee's account number	NO	
Payee's account virtual number	NO	IBAN format
BIC/SWIFT of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's country	NO	For foreign transfers only
Address of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Payee's data	NO	Name and address
Book date	NO	
Book balance	NO	Account book balance after the transaction

## /getTransactionsPending

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENT
Element ID	YES	Transaction or hold ID assigned by the ASPSP
The transaction amount	YES	
Currency of transaction	NO	ISO code of the transaction currency
Transaction title	YES	
Operation Date	NO	
MCC code	NO	Merchant Category Code for each transaction/operation made using a card
Transaction type	NO	
Transaction category	YES	credit/debit
Originator's data	NO	In case of transactions originated by people other than the account holder, name and address
Sender's account number	NO	
Sender's virtual account number	NO	IBAN format
BIC/SWIFT of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's country	NO	For foreign transfers only



Address of the sender's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Sender's data	NO	Name and address
Payee's account number	NO	
Payee's account virtual number	NO	IBAN format
BIC/SWIFT of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's country	NO	For foreign transfers only
Address of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Payee's data	NO	Name and address

## /getTransactionsRejected

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENT
Element ID	YES	Transaction or hold ID assigned by the ASPSP
The transaction amount	YES	
Currency of transaction	NO	ISO code of the transaction currency
Transaction title	YES	
Operation Date	NO	
MCC code	NO	Merchant Category Code for each transaction/operation made using a card
Transaction type	NO	
Transaction category	YES	credit/debit
Originator's data	NO	In case of transactions originated by people other than the account holder, name and address
Sender's account number	NO	
Sender's virtual account number	NO	IBAN format
BIC/SWIFT of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's country	NO	For foreign transfers only
Address of the sender's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Sender's data	NO	Name and address
Payee's account number	NO	
Payee's account virtual number	NO	IBAN format
BIC/SWIFT of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's country	NO	For foreign transfers only
Address of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Payee's data	NO	Name and address
Reason for rejection	NO	
Rejection date	NO	

## /getTransactionsCancelled

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENT
Element ID	YES	Transaction or hold ID assigned by the ASPSP
The transaction amount	YES	
Currency of transaction	NO	ISO code of the transaction currency
Transaction title	YES	



Operation Date	NO	
MCC code	NO	Merchant Category Code for each transaction/operation made using a card
Transaction type	NO	
Transaction category	YES	credit/debit
Transaction status	NO	Dictionary value
Originator's data	NO	In case of transactions originated by people other than the account holder, name and address
Sender's account number	NO	
Sender's virtual account number	NO	IBAN format
BIC/SWIFT of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's country	NO	For foreign transfers only
Address of the sender's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Sender's data	NO	Name and address
Payee's account number	NO	
Payee's account virtual number	NO	IBAN format
BIC/SWIFT of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's country	NO	For foreign transfers only
Address of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Payee's data	NO	Name and address

## /getTransactionsScheduled

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENT
Element ID	YES	Transaction or hold ID assigned by the ASPSP
The transaction amount	YES	
Currency of transaction	NO	ISO code of the transaction currency
Transaction title	YES	
Operation Date	NO	
MCC code	NO	Merchant Category Code for each transaction/operation made using a card
Transaction type	NO	
Transaction category	YES	credit/debit
Transaction status	NO	Dictionary value
Originator's data	NO	In case of transactions originated by people other than the account holder, name and address
Sender's account number	NO	
Sender's virtual account number	NO	IBAN format
BIC/SWIFT of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's country	NO	For foreign transfers only
Address of the sender's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Sender's data	NO	Name and address
Payee's account number	NO	
Payee's account virtual number	NO	IBAN format



BIC/SWIFT of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's country	NO	For foreign transfers only
Address of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Payee's data	NO	Name and address

## /getHolds

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENT
Element ID	YES	holds, ASPSP-assigned
Hold amount	YES	
Currency	NO	ISO Currency Code
Transaction title	YES	
Operation Date	NO	
MCC code	NO	Merchant Category Code for each transaction/operation made using a card
Transaction type	NO	credit/debit
Hold end date	NO	
Originator's data	NO	In case of transactions originated by people other than the account holder, name and address
Sender's account number	NO	
Sender's virtual account number	NO	IBAN format
BIC/SWIFT of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's country	NO	For foreign transfers only
Address of the sender's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Sender's data	NO	Name and address
Payee's account number	NO	
Payee's account virtual number	NO	IBAN format
BIC/SWIFT of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's country	NO	For foreign transfers only
Address of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Payee's data	NO	Name and address

## /getTransactionDetail

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENT
Element ID	YES	Transaction or hold ID assigned by the ASPSP
The transaction amount	YES	
Currency of transaction	NO	ISO code of the transaction currency
Transaction title	YES	
Operation Date	NO	
MCC code	NO	Merchant Category Code for each transaction/operation made using a card
Transaction type	NO	
Transaction category	YES	credit/debit
Transaction status	NO	Dictionary value



Originator's data	NO	In case of transactions originated by people other than the account holder, name and address
Sender's account number	NO	
Sender's virtual account number	NO	IBAN format
BIC/SWIFT of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's Bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the sender's country	NO	For foreign transfers only
Address of the sender's Bank		For foreign transfers only
Sender's data	NO	Name and address
Payee's account number	NO	
Payee's account virtual number	NO	IBAN format
BIC/SWIFT of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Name of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Code of the payee's country	NO	For foreign transfers only
Address of the payee's bank	NO	For foreign transfers only
Payee's data	NO	Name and address
Book date	NO	
Balance	NO	Account balance after the transaction
Element ID	YES	holds, ASPSP-assigned
Tax ID number	NO	Payer's basic identifier with the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS), i.e. NIP.
Payer's additional identification number	NO	Value of the payer's additional identifier with the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) (the value appropriate to the type of payer's additional identifier selected in the 'Type of payer's additional identifier' field)
Type of payer's additional identifier	NO	Dictionary value defining the type of the payer's additional identifier with the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS).
Payment type	NO	Only for transfers to the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS)
Declaration number	NO	Value of declaration number for transfers to the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) compliant with the form of this type of transfers
Declaration period	NO	Value of declaration period for transfers to the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) compliant with the form of this type of transfers
Payment type ID	NO	Value of ID of the liability to be transferred to the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) compliant with the form of this type of transfers
Number of the executive title	NO	Value of declaration number for transfers to the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) compliant with the form of this type of transfers
Payer's ID	YES	Only for transfers to tax authorities / customs authorities in Poland
Payer's ID type	YES	Only for transfers to tax authorities / customs authorities in Poland
Symbol of the tax or customs form	YES	Only for transfers to tax authorities / customs authorities in Poland
Period number	CONDITIONALLY	Required conditionally - depending on the value of the parameter in the Form symbol field. Only for transfers to tax authorities / customs authorities in Poland.
Period type	CONDITIONALLY	Required conditionally - depending on the value of the parameter in the Form symbol field. Only for transfers to tax authorities / customs authorities in Poland.

Period year	CONDITIONALLY	Required conditionally - depending on the value of the parameter in the Form symbol field. Only for transfers to tax authorities / customs authorities in Poland.
ID of the liability under which the tax is due, e.g. decision, executive title, ruling	NO	Only for transfers to tax authorities / customs authorities in Poland
Card holder	NO	
Card number	NO	
Exchange rate date	NO	
Currency conversion rates	NO	
Currency code before the conversion transaction	NO	ISO code
Currency code after the conversion transaction	NO	
Currency of original transaction	NO	ISO code
Amount in original currency	NO	
Unique ID of the payment instrument by which the transaction was effected	NO	
TPP-side unique transaction ID	NO	In case of transactions initiated as part of the PIS service
TPP's name	NO	In case of transactions initiated as part of the PIS service
Reason for Rejection	NO	In case of rejected transactions
Hold end date	NO	In case of account holds
Is payment using the Split Payment mechanism	No	Value determining whether the transfer is initiated using the Split Payment mechanism. The default value is false
Invoice number	Conditionally	Invoice number that the transfer relates to. Required when the Split Payment mechanism is used.
Transfer recipient's ID	Conditionally	For example, tax identification number. Required when the Split Payment mechanism is used.
VAT amount	Conditionally	Required when the Split Payment mechanism is used.
Additional description	No	

The fields described in the table above become mandatory for ASPSPs in relation to the scope of information about payment accounts and transactions the given ASPSP makes available in its online interface, save exceptions stipulated in the law (e.g. with regard to particularly protected data concerning payments or personal data). To the scope of data concerning the account and transactions, each ASPSP may add additional fields, taking advantage for this purpose of the auxData type Map field within the AccountInfo, TransactionInfo, HoldInfo, TransactionPendingInfo and TransactionRejectedInfo structures.

The list of fields made available when the ASPSP allows the use of the account list retrieval within the process of granting consent for the AIS or PIS services.

#### /getAccounts

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENT
Account number	Yes	Account number in a masked form, only the 2 first and last 4 digits of the account number visible without masking, according to the ASPSP's decision. In case of account number masking, the ASPSP should ensure a number decrypting mechanism to enable the performance of the AIS service.
Account type name	Yes	Product's commercial name



(defined by the Bank)		
Account type	Yes	E.g. account for the consumer / business account + product reference, e.g. account, credit card, savings account, etc.
Type of relation between PSU and an Account	YES	Dictionary value
Type of relation between PSU and an Account	NO	Dictionary value

### 3.2.5 Diagrams of Requests under the AIS Service within the Compliance Scope

The diagrams have been presented in Use Case #2 in Chapter [4](#).

## 3.3 Business Definition of the Compliance Scope for the CAF Service

The service of confirmation of funds at the payer's payment account in an amount sufficient to effect the payment transaction within the Compliance Scope consists in sending a request by the TPP acting as a PIISP to the ASPSP for a confirmation whether or not the PSU's payment account has funds in the amount as determined in the request on the basis of consent granted earlier by the PSU. In response, the ASPSP sends a message in the form of 'YES' or 'NO'.

### 3.3.1 List of Fields Required by the ASPSP in the Compliance Scope

In order to support a request concerning a conformation of funds at the payer's payment account in an amount sufficient to effect a CAF payment transaction within the Compliance Scope correctly, the ASPSP may request from the PSU, via the TPP (PIISP), that the following fields be completed with transaction order data.

FIELD NAME	REQUIRED	COMMENTS
Identifier of account the request concerns	Yes	Account previously connected with the payment instrument on the basis of consent granted by the PSU.
Amount	Yes	
Currency	Yes	Currency of transaction

### 3.3.2 Diagrams of Requests under the CAF Service within the Compliance Scope

The diagram was presented in Use Case #3 in Chapter [4](#).

## 4 Sample Use Cases

The current PolishAPI standard version described the manner of performance of XS2A interface-based transactions within the Compliance Scope as defined in Chapter 3 hereof and the TPP may participate in such transactions in one of the roles defined.

Examples illustrating the use of particular services were presented in this chapter. Their aim is only to illustrate the steps for particular services and should not be treated as an exhaustive list of admissible use cases.

### 4.1 Use Case #1: payment initiation by the PISP (PIS)


The use of a PIS service within the Compliance Scope as presented in this Use Case consists in the initiation by the TPP acting as a PISP of a payment transaction debited to the PSU's payment account held by the ASPSP on the basis of applicable provisions of the Payment Services Act. The ASPSP may reject the transaction if the TPP (PISP) has not been identified as an entity authorised to effect a PIS service.

#### 4.1.1 Consent granting and payment initiation performance (single payment with a current or future date, recurring payments, multiple payments – transfer batch) – ASPSP-side authentication

- 001 / PSU initiates the process in the TPP's interface
- 002 / TPP displays the list of ASPSPs
- 003 / PSU selects an ASPSP from the list and grants a consent to TPP to provide the PIS service, including a consent for the initiation of a transfer, a recurring transfer or a batch of transfers, and a consent for a query about the current status of a transfer, a recurring transfer or a batch of transfers, after they have been initiated
- 004 / PSU completes the transfer, recurring transfer or multi-transfer form meeting the requirements described in Chapter 3.1.1 and containing at least the information indicated in Chapter 3.1.4 of this specification: 'List of Fields Required by the ASPSP in the Compliance Scope' – depending on the option and with or without the account number
- 005 / TPP initiates the PIS process (use of the method /authorize, including the provision of scope and scope\_details), then there is a redirection to the ASPSP's domain in order to authenticate the PSU
- 006 / ASPSP verifies the TPP's identify on the basis of a certificate (or also on the basis of the register of TPPs)
- 007 / ASPSP sends an authentication request to the PSU
- 008 / Authentication (SCA, if required)
- 009 and 009A / ASPSP displays to the PSU the transaction details and the account list (in the ASPSP-side account selection option), PSU indicates the account from which the payment will be initiated
- 010 / ASPSP generates and sends to the PSU an additional authorization element (e.g. OTP) – provided that it is required in accordance with the regulations in force

- 011 / PSU authorises the transaction using the method applied in relations with the ASPSP (the PSU has an option to refuse authorisation, which results in the fact that the payment transaction is not effected). After a successful authorization of a transfer, a recurring transfer or a batch of transfers by the PSU, there is an establishment of the XS2A interface session between the ASPSP and TPP, in consequence of which the ASPSP provides an access token and a refresh token to the TPP (use of the method /token and, after the XS2A session establishment, one of the following methods: /domestic, /tax, /EEA, /nonEEA, /bundle/recurring)
- 012 / ASPSP performs the request and then a redirection is made to the TPP's domain

***the payment initiation process is terminated***




**Figure 5: PIS – ASPSP-side authentication**

#### 4.1.2 Consent granting and payment initiation performance (single payment with a current or future date, recurring payments, multiple payments – transfer batch) – Authentication in an external authorization tool

- 001 / PSU initiates the process in the TPP's interface
- 002 / TPP displays the list of ASPSPs
- 003 / PSU selects an ASPSP from the list and grants a consent to TPP to provide the PIS service, including a consent for the initiation of a transfer, a recurring transfer or a batch of transfers, and a consent for a query about the current status transfer or a batch of transfers, after they have been initiated
- 004 / PSU completes the transfer, recurring transfer or multi-transfer form meeting the requirements described in Chapter 3.1.1 and containing at least the information indicated in Chapter 3.1.4 of this specification: 'List of Fields Required by the ASPSP in the Compliance Scope' – together with an account number
- 005 / TPP initiates the PIS process (use of the method /authorizeExt, including the provision of scope and scope\_details)

- 006 / ASPSP verifies the TPP's identify on the basis of a certificate (or also on the basis of the register of TPPs)
- 007 / ASPSP initiates the process of PSU's authentication, including provides to the EAT an instruction concerning the use of the 2nd authorisation element – if this is required as per the regulations in force
- 008 / Authentication (SCA, if required)
- 009 / The external authorization tool displays the payment details and the PSU accepts the transaction
- 010 / PSU authorises the transaction (PSU has an option to refuse authorisation, which results in the fact that the payment transaction is not effected). After a successful authorization of a transfer, a recurring transfer or a batch of transfers by the PSU, there is an establishment of the XS2A interface session between the ASPSP and TPP, in consequence of which the ASPSP provides an access token and a refresh token to the TPP (use of the method /token and, after the XS2A session establishment, one of the following methods: /domestic, /tax, /EEA, /nonEEA, /bundle/recurring)
- 011 / ASPSP performs the request and then a redirection is made to the TPP's domain

***the payment initiation process is terminated***



**Figure 6: PIS – authentication in an external authorization tool**

#### 4.1.3 Payment status request (single payment with a current or future date, recurring payment, multiple payment – transfer batch)


- 001 / TPP sends a new access token issue request (new communication session establishment as per the description in 11.3), on the basis of the refresh token value obtained in step 011 (ASPSP-side authentication) or 010 (authentication in an external authorization tool), and a new scope of consents, which comprises a possibility to request the status of a transfer or a batch of transfers

- 002 / ASPSP verifies the TPP's request, in particular the refresh token value submitted and the data describing the consent requested, whereby a new XS2A interface communications session is established and new access token and refresh token values, which identify the session, are sent to the TPP
- 003 / TPP sends the PIS request concerning the retrieval of the status of a transfer, a recurring transfer or a batch of transfers, using the above-mentioned access token
- 004 / ASPSP performs the request

***the payment status request process is terminated***

- 001 / ASPSP sends the payment status asynchronously

***the payment status provision process is terminated***




**Figure 7: PIS – status request**

#### 4.1.4 Payment cancellation (single payment with a future date, recurring payment with a future date, single payment as part of a multiple payment (with a future date) or a multiple payment – a batch of transfers) – ASPSP-side authentication

- 001 / PSU initiates the process in the TPP's interface
- 002 / TPP displays the list of ASPSPs
- 003 / PSU selects an ASPSP from the list
- 004 / PSU selects the payment, a definition of a recurring payment or a batch to be cancelled
- 005 / TPP initiates the cancellation process (use of the method /authorize, including the provision of scope and scope\_details)
- 006 / ASPSP verifies the TPP's identify on the basis of a certificate (or also on the basis of the register of TPPs)
- 007 / ASPSP initiates the process of PSU's authentication
- 008 / Authentication
- 009 / ASPSP displays details of the payment cancelled to the PSU
- 010 / ASPSP generates and delivers to the PSU an additional authorization element (e.g. OTP)

- 011 / PSU authorizes the payment cancellation as per the method used in relations with the ASPSP. After a successful authorization of a cancellation, there is an establishment of the XS2A interface session between the ASPSP and TPP, in consequence of which the ASPSP provides an access token to the TPP (use of the method /token and, after the XS2A session establishment, the method /cancelPayments or /cancelRecurringPayment)
- 012 / ASPSP performs the request and then a redirection is made to the TPP's domain

***the payment /batch cancellation process is terminated***



**Figure 8: PIS – payment cancellation – ASPSP-side authentication**


#### 4.1.5 Payment cancellation (single payment with a future date, recurring payment with a future date, single payment as part of a multiple payment (with a future date) or a multiple payment – a batch of transfers) – authentication in an external authorization tool

- 001 / PSU initiates the process in the TPP's interface
- 002 / TPP displays the list of ASPSPs
- 003 / PSU selects an ASPSP from the list
- 004 / PSU selects the payment, a definition of a recurring payment or a batch to be cancelled
- 005 / TPP initiates the cancellation process (use of the method /authorizeExt, including the provision of scope and scope\_details)
- 006 / ASPSP verifies the TPP's identify on the basis of a certificate (or also on the basis of the register of TPPs)
- 007 / ASPSP initiates the process of PSU's authentication, including provides to the EAT an instruction concerning the use of the 2nd authorisation element
- 008 / Authentication
- 009 / EAT displays details of the payment cancelled to the PSU
- 010 / PSU authorizes the payment cancellation as per the method used in relations with the ASPSP. After a successful authorization of a cancellation, there is an establishment of the XS2A

interface session between the ASPSP and TPP, in consequence of which the ASPSP provides an access token to the TPP (use of the method /token and, after the XS2A session establishment, the method /cancelPayments or /cancelRecurringPayment

- 011 / ASPSP performs the request

***the payment /batch cancellation process is terminated***



**Figure 9: PIS – payment cancellation – authentication in an external authorization tool**

## 4.2 Use Case #2: payment account information display by the AISP (AIS)


The use of an AIS service within the Compliance Scope as presented in this Use Case consists in the acquisition by the TPP acting as an AISP of information about the PSU's payment account held by the ASPSP on the basis of applicable provisions of the Payment Services Act.

### 4.2.1 Consent granting and account information taking with a manual insertion of the account number (ASPSP-side authentication)

- 001 / PSU initiates the process in the TPP's interface
- 002 / TPP displays the list of ASPSPs
- 003 / PSU selects an ASPSP from the list and grants a consent to the given TPP to provide the account information service concerning an account maintained by the given ASPSP
- 004 / PSU inserts the account number and defines the scope of access
- 005 / TPP initiates the AIS process (use of the method /authorize, including the provision of scope and scope\_details), then there is a redirection to the ASPSP's domain in order to authenticate the PSU

- 006 / ASPSP verifies the TPP's identify on the basis of a certificate (or also on the basis of the register of TPPs)
- 007 / ASPSP sends an authentication request to the PSU
- 008 / SCA authentication. After a successful authentication by the PSU, there is an establishment of the XS2A interface session between the ASPSP and TPP, in consequence of which the ASPSP provides an access token and a refresh token to the TPP (use of the method /token and, after the XS2A session establishment, one of the following methods: /getAccount, /getTransactionsDone, /getTransactionsPending, /getTransactionsRejected, /getTransactionsCancelled, /getTransactionsScheduled, /getHolds, /getTransactionDetail)
- 009 / ASPSP performs the request and then a redirection is made to the TPP's domain

***the account information taking process is terminated***



**Figure 10: AIS – manual insertion of the account number – ASPSP-side authentication**

#### 4.2.2 Consent granting and account information taking with a manual insertion of the account number– authentication in an external authorization tool


- 001 / PSU initiates the process in the TPP's interface
- 002 / TPP displays the list of ASPSPs
- 003 / PSU selects an ASPSP from the list and grants a consent to the given TPP to provide the account information service concerning an account maintained by the given ASPSP
- 004 / PSU inserts the account number and defines the scope of access
- 005 / TPP initiates the AIS process (use of the method /authorizeExt, including the provision of scope and scope\_details)
- 006 / ASPSP verifies the TPP's identify on the basis of a certificate (or also on the basis of the register of TPPs)
- 007 / ASPSP initiates the process of PSU's authentication
- 008 / SCA authentication. After a successful authentication by the PSU, there is an establishment of the XS2A interface session between the ASPSP and TPP, in consequence of



which the ASPSP provides an access token and a refresh token to the TPP (use of the method /token and, after the XS2A session establishment, one of the following methods: /getAccount, /getTransactionsDone, /getTransactionsPending, /getTransactionsRejected, /getTransactionsCancelled, /getTransactionsScheduled, /getHolds, /getTransactionDetail)

- 009 / ASPSP performs the request

***the account information taking process is terminated***



**Figure 11: AIS – manual insertion of the account number– authentication in an external authorization tool**


#### 4.2.3 Consent granting and account information taking with ASPSP-side account selection – ASPSP-side authentication

- 001 / PSU initiates the process in the TPP's interface
- 002 / TPP displays the list of ASPSPs
- 003 / PSU selects an ASPSP from the list and grants a consent to the given TPP to provide the account information service concerning an account maintained by the given ASPSP
- 004 / TPP initiates the AIS process (use of the method /authorize, including the provision of scope and scope\_details)
- 005 / ASPSP verifies the TPP's identify on the basis of a certificate (or also on the basis of the register of TPPs)
- 006 / ASPSP sends an authentication request to the PSU
- 007 / SCA authentication
- 008 / ASPSP displays a list of accounts
- 009 / PSU indicates an account (accounts), in the context of which it wants to obtain information. After a successful authentication and account indication by the PSU, there is an establishment of the XS2A interface session between the ASPSP and TPP, in consequence of

which the ASPSP provides an access token and a refresh token to the TPP (use of the method /token and, after the XS2A session establishment, the method /getAccounts)

- 010 / ASPSP performs the request, taking into consideration the step 009 indications
- 011 / TPP displays a list of indicated accounts
- 012 / PSU determines the access parameters for the accounts indicated, TPP calls the method /token with the use of the method exchange\_token, in consequence of which the ASPSP provides to the TPP a new access token and a new refresh token, and then one of the following methods is called: : /getAccount, /getTransactionsDone, /getTransactionsPending, /getTransactionsRejected, /getTransactionsCancelled, /getTransactionsScheduled, /getHolds, /getTransactionDetail
- 013 / ASPSP performs the request

***the account information taking process is terminated***



**Figure 12: PIS – ASPSP-side account selection – ASPSP-side authentication**


#### 4.2.4 Consent granting and account information taking with an account list retrieval – ASPSP-side authentication

- 001 / PSU initiates the process in the TPP's interface
- 002 / TPP displays the list of ASPSPs
- 003 / PSU selects an ASPSP from the list and grants a consent to the given TPP to provide the account information service concerning an account maintained by the given ASPSP
- 004 / TPP initiates the AIS process (use of the method /authorize, including the provision of scope and scope\_details)
- 005 / ASPSP verifies the TPP's identity on the basis of a certificate (or also on the basis of the register of TPPs)
- 006 / ASPSP sends an authentication request to the PSU
- 007 / SCA authentication. After a successful authentication and account indication by the PSU, there is an establishment of the XS2A interface session between the ASPSP and TPP. In

consequence of which the ASPSP provides an access token and a refresh token to the TPP (use of the method /token and, after the XS2A session establishment, the method /getAccounts)

- 008 / ASPSP performs the request
- 009 / TPP displays a list of accounts
- 010 / PSU determines the access parameters for the accounts indicated, TPP calls the method /token with the use of the method exchange\_token, in consequence of which the ASPSP provides to the TPP a new access token and a new refresh token, and then one of the following methods is called: /getAccount, /getTransactionsDone, /getTransactionsPending, /getTransactionsRejected, /getTransactionsCancelled, /getTransactionsScheduled, /getHolds, /getTransactionDetail
- 011 / ASPSP performs the request

***the account information taking process is terminated***



**Figure 13: AIS – account list retrieval – ASPSP-side authentication**


#### 4.2.5 Consent granting and account information taking with an account list retrieval – authentication in an external authorization tool

- 001 / PSU initiates the process in the TPP's interface
- 002 / TPP displays the list of ASPSPs
- 003 / PSU selects an ASPSP from the list and grants a consent to the given TPP to provide the account information service concerning an account maintained by the given ASPSP
- 004 / TPP initiates the AIS process (use of the method /authorizeExt, including the provision of scope and scope\_details)
- 005 / ASPSP verifies the TPP's identify on the basis of a certificate (or also on the basis of the register of TPPs)
- 006 / ASPSP initiates the process of PSU's authentication
- 007 / SCA authentication. After a successful authentication and account indication by the PSU, there is an establishment of the XS2A interface session between the ASPSP and TPP, in

consequence of which the ASPSP provides an access token and a refresh token to the TPP (use of the method /token and, after the XS2A session establishment, the method /getAccounts)

- 008 / ASPSP performs the request
- 009 / TPP displays a list of accounts
- 010 / PSU determines the access parameters for the accounts indicated, TPP calls the method /token with the use of the method exchange\_token, in consequence of which the ASPSP provides to the TPP a new access token and a new refresh token, and then one of the following methods is called: /getAccount, /getTransactionsDone, /getTransactionsPending, /getTransactionsRejected, /getTransactionsCancelled, /getTransactionsScheduled, /getHolds, /getTransactionDetail
- 011 / ASPSP performs the request

***the account information taking process is terminated***




**Figure 14: AIS – account list retrieval – authentication in an external authorization tool**

#### 4.2.6 Account information retrieval without PSU's participation

- 001 / TPP sends the request to issue a new token based on a refresh token
- 002 / ASPSP verifies the TPP's identify on the basis of a certificate (or also on the basis of the register of TPPs). After a positive verification between the ASPSP and the TPP, an XS2A interface session is established, in consequence of which ASPSP sends to the TPP an access token based on a refresh token
- 003 / TPP calls one of the following methods: /getAccount, /getTransactionsDone, /getTransactionsPending, /getTransactionsRejected, /getTransactionsCancelled, /getTransactionsScheduled, /getHolds, /getTransactionDetail
- 004 / ASPSP performs the request

***the account information taking process is terminated***




**Figure 15: AIS – Account information retrieval without PSU's participation**

#### 4.2.7 Withdrawal of consent

- 001 / PSU initiates the process in the TPP's interface
- 002 / TPP displays a list of consents
- 003 / PSU selects a specific consent from the list of consents within the framework of which the changes will be made
- 004 / PSU withdraws the consent for the AIS service
- 005 / TPP sends a token revocation request to the ASPSP (use of the method /deleteConsent)

**consent withdrawal process is terminated**



**Figure 16: AIS – consent withdrawal**


### 4.3 Use Case #3: request for confirmation of funds by a PIISP (CAF)

The use of an CAF service within the Compliance Scope as presented in this Use Case consists in the initiation by the TPP acting as an PIISP of a request for availability of funds in the transaction amount at the PSU's payment account on the basis of applicable provisions of the Payment Services Act.

The PSU must previously indicate to the PIISP a payment account that will be verified in each case in terms of funds availability and grants his/her consent for the ASPSP holding the given payment account

to answer such requests. The PSU initiates a business process requiring a verification whether or not the payment account previously indicated by the PSU has funds available in the amount equal at least to the requested amount. In order to effect the service, the PIISP establishes an XS2A session with ASPSP, sends a request and receives a 'YES' or 'NO' answer.

This process has been presented at a high level in the diagram below.



**Figure 17: CAF – request for confirmation of funds**

- 001/ Transaction initiation using a payment instrument
- 002 / TPP calls the method /getConfirmationOfFunds
- 003 / ASPSP verifies the TPP's identify on the basis of a certificate (or also on the basis of the register of TPPs).
- 004 / ASPSP verifies the consent for the service on its side, after a positive verification, the request is performed

***the confirmation of funds request process is terminated***

## 5 Polish API Technical Specification

### 5.1 Technical Assumptions

The table below presents the technical assumptions made for the PolishAPI:

No.	ASSUMPTION	DESCRIPTION	GROUND
1	Direct TPP-ASPSP communication	In the basic variant of the PolishAPI, the TPP and the ASPSP communicate with each other directly.	The peer-to-peer architecture used increases the safety and efficiency as well as allows the avoidance of a single point of failure.
2	Role of the PSD2 HUB	In case the ASPSP uses the services of a PSD2 HUB, it is neutral for the TPP. The PSD2 HUB presents itself using the ASPSP's certificate, from the TPP's perspective, there is no difference whether it gets connected with the PSD2 HUB or directly with the ASPSP.	Efficient and Safe API and PolishAPI Standard Implementation.
3	The TPP-ASPSP communication is a server-server one	No direct communication of the client's device (e.g. a mobile app) with the ASPSP's PolishAPI servers is allowed. The TPP should be legally obliged to secure the access keys (so-called access certificate). In particular, the access certificates may not be installed in mobile apps made available to the PSUs)	
4	Separation of the client's consent step from the operation performance step	The client's consent for the service performance will be separated from the performance of the operation itself. One of the effects will be the fact that the consent in itself will not entail any financial consequences.	Flexibility in the implementation of new services, including the Premium Services.
5	Scope of the PolishAPI	<p>The scope of PolishAPI specifies the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- way of granting consent for the performance by the TPP of an operation on behalf of the customer</li> <li>- scope of operations and rights</li> <li>- URL where the given service is available</li> <li>- standard scope of parameters per service</li> <li>- security mechanisms</li> <li>- communication principles</li> <li>- error handling</li> </ul> <p>The PolishAPI does not specify the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- full scope of functionalities to be made available by the ASPSP as well as the information as to</li> </ul>	The RTS make the scope of functionality and the scope of data dependent on the scope of functionality made available in the Internet banking, which is different for each ASPSP

		which ones of them will not be within the Compliance Service - full specification of fields per service for each ASPSP	
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## 5.2 XS2A Session Establishment

The use by a TPP of business services (AIS, PIS, CAF), made available at the ASPSP's side, requires the so-called communications session to be started at the side of the technical solutions of the entities listed.

The process of starting a communications session with the XS2A interface comprises the requests and responses exchanged between the TPP and ASPSP using the technical services of that interface (AS – Authorization Service), in effect of which the communications session is started and the ASPSP's side and its technical representation, including such metadata as its validity date, is sent to the TPP.


The establishment of a communications session may take into consideration the necessity to ensure a strong authentication of the PSU. Considering the SCA method selected (*ASPSP-side* or *decoupled*), the communications session starting process may vary. Irrespective of the said differences as regards the SCA methods, the communications session establishment is based on the OAuth 2.0 standard assumptions in the following matters:

- a) The required method of authorisation of access to the ASPSP resources made available via the XS2A business interface is the return by the ASPSP-side server, in response to each request sent by the TPP, of a one-time authorisation code – within the understanding of Art. 4 of the RTSs, which will be used by the TPP in the next step to obtain an access code as per the provisions of the OAuth 2.0 standard.
- b) The *state* parameter sent by the TPP in the authorization request (item a) must be unique for each authorization process performed by the given TPP.
- c) It is suggested that the one-time authentication code on the ASPSP's server side and the access token were the resource identifier in the database, in which the indicated resource data will be used to identify the PSU for whom the access token is generated or the defined business operation is effected.  
The use of the so-called *stateless token* (e.g. JWT Token - RFC 7519) should be resorted to only in case when the disclosure of the ASPSP's customer data (including the ID) is compliant with the security policy
- d) Together with the access token, the scope parameter (the same as in the request sent by the TPP) is transferred to the TPP.

The TPP's use of a valid communications session is a pre-condition for the reception of correct responses to the requests sent to the XS2A interface business services.

The diagram of the XS2A communications session establishment process flow is presented below.





**Figure 18: Multilayer XS2A session establishment diagram**

Each transaction under the XS2A interface business services takes place as part of a dedicated and separate communications session, whereby for the selected methods under the AIS and PIS services and assuming the fulfilment of the conditions defined in the business and technical parts of the PSD2 Directive, a multiple use of the same communications session when sending requests to the XS2A interface business services, without the need to perform the SCA procedure for the PSU on each occasion and while maintaining the validity of the communications session, after which it will be automatically cancelled by the ASPSP.

The XS2A interface technical service may offer an alternative and automatic (i.e. not requiring any interaction with the PSU) mechanism of starting a communications session, i.e. the refresh token. The mechanism allows a refreshment of the communications session previously cancelled by the ASPSP without the need to repeat the SCA procedure, based on a separate session identifier (*refresh token*) sent to the TPP in response to the request to start the original communications session.

### 5.3 Definition of Access Token

The access token is a technical representation of the communications session with a defined validity that was established by and between the TPP and the ASPSP in the context of a precisely defined PSU and for a precisely defined scope of the ASPSP's side services and resources to which the TPP obtained access. The access token is a series of characters the role of which is to confirm the access authorization to secured resources made available via the XS2A interface services. The access token may have various forms and ways of interpretation. The final properties of the access token depend on the ASPSP-side authorization systems which implement the PolishAPI standard.

Pursuant to the regulations described in the RTSs of the PSD2 Directive, depending on the XS2A interface business service (AIS, PIS), for which the communications session was established, the access token may be used one time or many times before it is cancelled by the ASPSP, which will entail a necessity to re-run the SCA procedure for the PSU, in case of an intention to use the service again.

### 5.4 Mutual Authentication of the TPP and the ASPSP

The mutual authentication of the TPP and the ASPSP takes place on the basis of the X.509v3 certificates issued by a trusted third party. A trusted third party may be, in particular, an institution performing

the role of the Identity Hub. It may also be any other party offering a trust-based relationship based on public key infrastructure mechanisms.

All operations consisting in the flows specified and described in the standard are possible only in a situation of a correct authentication in a process that comprises a mutual authentication of the server and the client (mutual authentication). The TPP and the ASPSP may have the role of both a server and a client, but, in each case, it is required that the parties to the communication mutually authenticate each other.

A description of the public key infrastructure used for the needs of authentication of parties (TPP, ASPSP, PISP) is not a part of the Polish API standard. It should be described in separate documents (working standards), taking into account the structure of trust relation between the certification institutions and the interoperability of the Polish API with other solutions of this type in place in other countries.

## 5.5 Communication Protocol

HTTP /2 or HTTP 1.1, secured by TLS 1.2+ with a mutual authentication of the client and the server by means of the X.509v3 certificates will be used as the communication protocol. Due to the requirement to ensure non-repudiation (request and response signing), only the POST method will be used in the http communication.

## 5.6 Resource Name Diagram

The PolishAPI services will be made available under addresses compliant with the following model:

`https://{DNS domain}/{v{Resource version number 1}/{Resource name 1}}/.../v{Resource version number n}/{Resource name n}`

Field description:

- DNS domain/address – where the ASPSP makes the PolishAPI services available (information made available in the PSD2 register)
- Resource version number – number of the version according to PolishAPI specification (digit before the dot separated by the ‘\_’ sign) and subsequent interface number within the given ASPSP (digit after the dot)
- Resource name – number of the resource the request concerns; resources nesting routes, e.g. `/v{version number of resource accounts}/accounts/v{number version of resource transactionsDone}/transactionsDone`

## 5.7 Versioning

- The principle of versioning the API, PolishAPI specification, is based on the Semantic Versioning v2.0.0 convention (<https://semver.org/>). It assumes the use of the version designation using three numbers separated by a separator: X\_Y\_Z.
- Each of the following parts separated by a separator is a natural number (e.g. 1\_12\_1). The first segment means the major version, middle - minor, and last - patch.
- The major version is used to identify backward or breakthrough incompatible changes to the currently published version of the API.
- The minor version is used to determine successive API functionalities. According to the naming convention, functionalities in the API, for a given version of it, should only grow, unless there is a clearly defined change regarding deprecation. Changes made to the minor version should not cause incompatibilities.



- e) The patch version is intended for use only for security and functionality improvements or bug fixes, not causing backward incompatibility or functional increments.
- f) The rule is not to publish simultaneous changes to the functionality extension (minor) and error correction (patch).
- g) Minor changes will be introduced no more than twice a year.
- h) In the case of a major change, to ensure compliance with the standard, it should be implemented within a maximum of 6 months from the date of publication.
- i) In the case of a minor change, to ensure compliance with the standard, it should be implemented within a maximum of 12 months from the date of publication or depending on the date of publication of the next major version.
- j) In the case of a major change as referred to in point (h) above and a minor change as referred to in point (i) above, the maximum period of introduction of changes referred to applies to changes in the test environment (sandbox). Changes in the production environment may be introduced later after the interface has been tested by TPP, including in particular the 3-month period referred to in art. 30 paragraph 4 RTS.

## 5.8 Canonical Data Model

The detailed description of the data structure is available in the swagger, in section 'Models'.

## 5.9 Operations

Due to the requirement to ensure non-repudiation in the http communication, only the POST method will be used as it allows the JWS Signature format signature. Within the operation, the context of a specific user is determined on the basis of an access token. This principle applies both to the requests sent by the TPP to the ASPSP's XS2A interface, as well as requests sent from the ASPSP to the XS2A callback interface provided by the TPP.

## 5.10 Sorting

The records returned are sorted chronologically (on a reversed basis) as per the transaction date.

## 5.11 Filtering

Filtering in the AIS service takes place after setting the appropriate properties in the TransactionInfoRequest class object:

- a) itemIdFrom – transactions or holds from the given ID 'chronologically'
- b) transactionDateFrom – initial transaction date of the data range requested
- c) transactionDateTo – final transaction date of the data range requested
- d) bookingDateFrom – initial booking date of the data range requested
- e) bookingDateTo – final booking date of the data range requested
- f) transactionCategory – CREDIT or DEBIT
- g) minAmount – minimum operation amount within the data range requested
- h) maxAmount – maximum operation amount within the data range requested

## 5.12 Paging

Results of requests containing many records (more than 100) should be paged. Next pages will be retrieved by setting the pageId attribute in the data structures responsible for sending the request for the account list retrieval and transaction list retrieval.

In response to the request to retrieve accounts or transactions, a PageInfo structure will be returned and it will contain optional parameters called nextPage and previousPage. These parameters, if returned, contain identifiers of the previous page and the next page with regard to the page returned in the request and, with the exception of this meaning, they are not subject to interpretation by the client application (they are any given script interpretable by the API supplier's side in the way that allows an identification of the page content, in particular, they may be internally loaded record identifiers from one or more systems or a representation of the so-called cursor).

In order to retrieve a specific page, it is necessary to provide in the next request, in the pageId parameter, one of the values obtained in the previous request, in the above-mentioned attributes nextPage or previousPage. The pageId attribute may contain only a value that is literally equal to the value returned in the nextPage or previousPage parameter of the previous request and is not subject to interpretation by the client application (in particular, it is not identical with the consecutive number, if the API issuer has not defined a possibility of such an interpretation).

The number of records per page is defined by means of the perPage attribute in the requests sent.

In case of use of the pageId parameter containing the value previously returned in nextPage or previousPage, the required number of records at the page should have the same value that the one use in the request the page identifier used originates from (additionally, there should be no changes to the filtering parameters, e.g.: itemIdFrom, transactionDateFrom, transactionDateTo, transactionCategory etc.). API has the right to return the paging error in case of a change in the requested page size or parameter paging between the requests, is the request uses the pageId parameter.

An empty value of the pageId parameter or its omission means that a first page retrieval request.

## 5.13 Response Statuses

The technical statuses will be returned by the following http codes:

STATUS	DESCRIPTION
200 OK	The operation was successful
204 No Content	The operation was successful. The response does not contain additional information.
400 Bad Request	The request is syntactically incorrect
401 Unauthorized	Incorrectly authenticated user
403 Forbidden	Authorisation error (no rights to access the resource)
405 Method Not Allowed	Use of an inappropriate method – the method used in the request is not allowed for the resource indicated (Only POST is used)
406 Not Acceptable	Incorrect Accept heading in the request (the server does not support it)
415 Unsupported Media Type	If an incorrect content type was set in the request
422 Unprocessable Entity	Validation error
429 Too Many Requests	Request rejected due to the fact that the maximum number of requests to access the resource has been exceeded
500 Internal Server Error	There was an unknown internal error of the API server
501 Not Implemented	XS2A interface doesn't support given functionality requested by TPP
503 Service Unavailable	The API server is temporarily unavailable

## 5.14 HTTP Header

The following HTTP headers will be used in the requests:

HEADER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
Authorization	String	Authentication header (used when sending a token). The value of the Authorization header should comprise the 'type' + 'credentials', where, in case the 'type' token approach is applied, the 'type' should have the value of 'Bearer'.
Date	Date	Request timestamp in the RFC 5322 date and time format.
Accept	Content type	Should be set to application/json. Otherwise the application should return 406 Not Acceptable HTTP.
Accept-Encoding	Gzip, deflate	The operation should support GZIP and DEFLATE coding, it may also return non-compressed data.
Accept-Language	'pl', 'en', etc.	Defined the preferred language in which the response is to be returned. The operation does not have to support this header
Accept-Charset	Charset type like 'UTF-8'	UTF-8
Content-Type	application/json	Should be set to application/json. Otherwise, the operation returns: 415 Unsupported Media Type HTTP status code
X-JWS-SIGNATURE	String	JWS Signature (Detached)
X-REQUEST-ID	String	Unique Identifier of the request issued by TPP

Response headers:

HEADER	REQUIRED	DESCRIPTION
Date	Yes	Timestamp on the basis of the GMT server time as per RFC 5322
Content-Type	Yes	application/json
Content-Encoding	Yes	GZIP or DEFLATE
Expires	No	Defines the caching policy for slowly varying objects e.g. Expires: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 21:31:12 GMT
Size	Yes	Response size in bytes
ETag	No	Resource version identifier
Last-Modified	No	Last resource modification date
X-JWS-SIGNATURE	Yes	JWS Signature (Detached)

## 5.15 Message format

The data exchange format will be JSON with the UTF-8 coding. All messages have a defined JSON schema draft #4. The parameter names will be saved camelCase.

## 5.16 Basic Data Formats

SIZE	JSON FORMAT	DESCRIPTION
Text	String	Text coded in UTF-8
Dates	String	Pursuant to ISO8601. Date and time will be represented in the form of YYYY-MM-DD to YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.ccczzzzz with the mandatory specification of the time zone Designations: YYYY – year, MM – month, DD – day, hh – hour, mm – minute, ss – second, ccc – millisecond (optional) zzzzzz – e.g. +02:00 or Z to denote universal time

		For example: 2016-10-10T12:00:05.342+01:00
Amounts	String	Written as digits with a sign separating the integer part from the fractional part up to the second decimal place (the dot sign). In case of positive value, no additional signs are given. In case of negative value, the '-' sign is added before the number
Integer	Number	The integer numbers are represented without group separators
Real number	String	Real numbers are represented without group separators and with the '.' sign as a decimal separator
Country codes	String	In accordance with ISO 3166
Currencies	String	Currency symbols in accordance with ISO 4217
Account numbers	String	IBAN numbers in accordance with ISO 13616
Bank identifiers	String	Bank Identifier Codes (BIC) in accordance with ISO 9362
Logical value	Boolean	Flags and logical tags which may take one of two values: true or false

## 5.17 Unique Identifier of the request and an algorithm for its generation

Each request sent by the TPP to the ASPSP -side XS2A interface must contain a unique identifier (a parameter called requestId in the header structure sent within the body of each request as well as in the HTTP header X-REQUEST-ID). The identifier's uniqueness must be ensured for all the requests sent by all the TPPs to the selected ASPSP.

The requirement that a unique request identifier be sent results from the necessity to verify all the requests received by the ASPSP in order to identify and reject the same requests received more than once, e.g. in result of a TPP-side error or of recurring and intentional message sending by the TPP in case there is no answer from the ASPSP.

The PolishAPI standard defines the required request identifier format which ensures uniqueness that has been defined as above and makes it possible to carry out the ASPSP-side request verification as described on a random basis, i.e. taking into account a small subset of earlier request identifiers, which will significantly and positively influence the efficiency of such verification and will indirectly ensure a faster response from the XS2A interface.

The required request identifier format is UUID (Universally Unique Identifier), which is a standard described in the RFC 4122 document (<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4122>). Additionally, it is required that the request identifier should be generated in variant No. 1 (see 4.1.1 RFC 4122) and in version No. 1 (see 4.1.3 RFC 4122), which will ensure that the identifier's value includes a monotonic component based on the request sending time and information identifying the request sender (TPP).

## 6 Security of information

This chapter presents general security requirements vital from the perspective of standard creation and its designing on the basis of the IT solution ecosystem compliant with the PolishAPI. Detailed security requirements comprising additionally the problems of security of PolishAPI-based system implementation, operation and maintenance will be described in a separate document and its development will be preceded by a preparation of a detailed risk model. In consequence, they will be an answer to specific identified threats, places where the threats may potentially materialise as well as the assessment of the level of materiality and probability and impact of the cases when such threats should materialise on the safety and operational continuity of the PolishAPI ecosystem.

Particular PolishAPI-based IT system components should have a clearly defined separation between the data layer, the controller's layer and the presentation layer. The components should be separated from each other by a defined security measures such as network segmentation or the firewall rules.

### 6.1 TPP's Authentication

TPP entities must be properly authenticated before they are granted access to the XS2A interface so as to ensure a high level of protection both from an impersonation on the part of unauthorised users of lawful TPPs and from an unauthorised escalation of the authorisation level by TPPs having a legal access to the interface. The authentication takes place on the basis of public key certificates during a mutual authentication process via the TLS 1.2+ protocol.

Authentication errors must result on the denial of access to the XS2A interface.

The user and session authentication data as well as operation authentication tokens may not be transferred in the form of URI parameters.

### 6.2 TPP's Authorisation

The TPP's authorisation must be based on the RBAC model (*Role Based Access Control*), where the level and scope of access to particular API resources depends on the role of the PolishAPI user.

The use of particular methods must be authorised so that the rights depended on the user's role. In particular, the level and scope of authorisation should be different for TPPs depending on the scope of their rights.

### 6.3 PSU's Authorisation for Operations made by a TPP

Irrespective of the PSU's authentication mechanism applied within the AIS and PIS services, it is assumed that the process will end by the issue by the ASPSP of an access token as defined in Chapter [5.3](#) of the specification. The operations are always requested by the TPP via a valid access token.

### 6.4 Security in case of Mobile Apps

For security reasons in a model using the authentication mechanism on the ASPSP's side, the redirection to the ASPSP's site and back to the TPP's site will take place in the browser (browsers other than the system browse will not be allowed, the application of the WebView will not be allowed) and not in the mobile app itself. The TPP may register the appropriate URL in the device's operating system so that after the redirection back to the TPP the mobile app be automatically resumed.



## 6.5 Data Validation and Integrity Assurance

The data must be subject to validation procedures in the context of variable types, the scope and the model of limit values. In particular, the structured JSON data must be parsed in accordance with the formal validation procedures, using a white list-based approach. The validation must also be made with regard to the Content-type and Accept (application/json) headers for the compliance of the header value with the actual text of the HTTP message.

During the validation, the digital signature in the header (X-JWS-SIGNATURE) must be validated in the context of the data provided both in the requests and in the http protocol responses as listed in the ASPSP-TPP communication. It should be stressed that this rule applies also in the case of communication initiated by the ASPSP side, in case of a use of the XS2A callback interface provided by the TPP.

Input data validation errors must be registered in logs.

The validation errors must be signalled by the HTTP 400 message (Bad Request) and the data must be rejected. This also concerns the negative validation of JWS-SIGNATURE.

In case of Content-type and Accept text validation errors, http message 406 should be returned (Not Acceptable).

Not validated or incorrectly validated data must be rejected.

## 6.6 Cryptography

The communication using the PolishAPI must ensure a cryptographic security at two levels:

- a) At the level of transmission via (https/TLS). The TLS connection parameter renegotiation must be made in a secure way in accordance with RFC 5746
- b) At the message level, in order to ensure the non-repudiation, it is necessary to apply the JSON Web Signature as per the RFC 7515 standard (<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515>). The signature should be included in each request in the X-JWS-SIGNATURE header

Each party to the communication (TPP, ASPSP) must have its own unique two pairs of keys (for transmission and for signature).

Separate certificates must be used to secure the transaction at the https level and at the JWS-SIGNATURE level. For https, the certificate must have an expanded key use (Client Authentication) for signature (Digital signature).

The certificates used to combine the transmission and the signature must be validated in terms of:

- a) Validity (certificate validity date from and to)
- b) No cancellation (crl/ocsp)
- c) Path verification (<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4158>)

Particularly sensitive information, including identification confirmations and authorization keys, may not be buffered or registered in logs.

Certificates should be issued taking into account the ETSI TS 119 495 specification.



### 6.6.1 Registration of TPP client applications on the ASPSP's side

The PolishAPI specification, meeting the requirements of the PSD2 directive, defines a dedicated AS (Authorization Services) service method called / register, which enables automatic registration of TPP client applications that are to gain access to the XS2A interface.

The registration of the client application is using the RFC 7591 standard (<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7591>), extended with additional information, and thus allows you to provide:

- increased security resulting from the lack of unlimited availability of public keys (significant limitation of the possibility of brute force attacks and attacks based on errors in the implementation of the JWT / JWS verification process, such as the use of the public key as a symmetric key as a result of injecting the "alg" value in JWT)
- the possibility of using separate keys per TPP and application (exchange of public keys), ensuring increased separability of activities
- the possibility for the TPP to use more than one, separate, client application, or to operate the application in various modes, forcing the restriction of permissions per application (not per TPP) - e.g. one TPP may have a separate application for initiating payments, different than that created by the same TPP application presenting the client's financial status - and these applications will not be able to perform activities outside their scope of rights, even though they fall under TPP's rights.
- providing additional data enabling the TPP to present information about TPP (name, logo, description of the subject of activity, links to terms of service etc.) and its application (name, description of the application's purpose, logo, URL to download) consistent with the TPP's intention e.t.c.)
- limitation of vulnerabilities associated with redirection to arbitrary addresses, the so-called open redirector

The described mechanism provides for the possibility of transfer between TPP and ASPSP:

1. Name, description and other information (e.g. logo) to present the application to the user (in the context of open banking APIs created for the purposes of the PSD2 Directive - the user is the bank's customer - PSU)
2. Application identification data in API calls, including the authorization API, with particular regard to the release of the unique client\_id application identifier (and not only - the organization - TPP - which allows one TPP to have many client applications with different permissions or operating in different "modes"), while support for many applications per TPP remains an ASPSP decision (the document assumes that ASPSP may limit the registration option to a single client application per TPP)
3. cryptographic material (keys and certificates) for use in subsequent communication, whereby the protocol supports both the possibility of exchanging symmetrical shared keys) and the transfer of public keys for verifying signatures and asymmetric encryption, and conducting cryptographic proof of possessing the corresponding private keys.
4. Transfer of client certificates to confirm the identity of the application issuer (along with conducting a cryptographic identity card by proof of having a private key corresponding to a trusted certificate), and thus its rights arising from regulatory authorization (eIDAS certificates in accordance with ETSI TS 119 495
5. Set forwarding addresses from OAuth2 authorization services

## The process of self-registration of the client application by TPP

Support for self-registration of the client application (hereinafter: TPP self-registration) by TPP based on the seal certificate is required for PSD2 regulatory scenarios.

In the PSD2 regulatory scenarios, the required and sufficient condition for registration is the transfer of an eIDAS certificate in accordance with ETSI TS 119 495, indicating the given regulatory authorization (TPP identifier assigned by the regulator, AISP / PISP / ASPSP roles etc.) and cryptographic proof of its ownership (proof of possession of a private key).

The method of proving a possession a private key seal is that the TPP signs the software\_statement token with that key, and the corresponding certificate must be on the jwks list.

## Content of request and response of the method / register

The registration request is sent via an encrypted channel (using TLS 1.2 or a newer standard), using the HTTP POST method, to the address / register. The content of the request is a JSON document (Content-type: application / json), in accordance with the requirements of point 3.1.1. RFC 7591 - "Client Registration Request Using a Software Statement". It is assumed that all facts included in the request should be provided as the content of the signed JWT token being the value of the software\_statement field.

The ASPSP may consider facts provided as fields outside the software\_statement token (in the fields of the main JSON document that are not inside the software\_statement content), provided they do not conflict with the content software\_statement.

The ASPSP cannot reject a request containing all the data required within software\_statement because of the value provided outside of this token.

## Registration request fields in the software\_statement token

Fact ID	Meaning	Required	Comments
iat	The moment of issuing the software_statement	No	To prevent re-use of the same request, with the right of the ASPSP to refuse requests after a specified period of time
aud	Assumed recipient of the request	No / Conditionally to the decision of the ASPSP	The ASPSP has the right to require the issuing of a software_statement listing the given ASPSP as the recipient - an element that enhances security by preventing the same request from being used with another provider, and ensuring better disconnect.
iss	software_statement issuer ID	Yes	Example value - ASPSP ID.

iss_name	software_statement issuer name	No	Is a TPP identifier issued by the regulator and coded in accordance with the requirements of ETSI TS 119 495.
sub	The organization ID requesting access to its application. For PSD2 regulatory scenarios - TPP identifier assigned by the regulator	Not in regulatory scenarios where it can be read from the certificate	If provided, it must be the same as the identification of the organization to which the certificate applies
sub_name	Name (full) of the organization requesting access for its application - the full name of the TPP	No	As long as the given name cannot contradict (be different) from the name given in the certificate provided by the organization
sub_descr	Description of the organization requesting access for its application	No	
sub_logo	The logo URL of the organization requesting access for its application	No	
sub_contact_name	Name of contact person	No	
sub_contact_email	Email to contact person	No	
sub_org_number	Tax identification number in the European registration organization format	No	
sub_country	Country of organization registration	No	
client_name	The name of the client application	No	If not specified, the TPP name is used (from the sub_name or certificate field)
response_types	In accordance with RFC 7591	No	Fixed value: "code"
grant_types	According to RFC 7591, extended to "exchange_token"	No	It can take one of the following values: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>authorization_code</li> </ul>

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• refresh_token</li> <li>• exchange_token</li> </ul>
redirect_uris	URLs that can be redirected to after the call to the / authorize method has been completed	Yes	It is assumed that redirection to a different URL than that indicated in this parameter is not allowed.
response_types		No	Fixed value: "code"
jwks	A collection of keys (certificates - for asymmetric cryptography) that can be used by the TPP to sign requests (and optionally to establish encrypted TLS communication).	Conditionally YES (unless jwks_uri specified)	<p>It must contain the certificate (or url for download the certificate) of the seal in accordance with ETSI TS 119 495, which can be used to sign the requests sent to the XS2A interface.</p> <p>The bank may optionally support the handling of many certificates per TPP / application, in which case it may contain more than one seal certificate.</p> <p>While the TPP intends to use the "kid" parameter to identify the key used to sign API requests, the value of this parameter must be provided for each key in jwks / jwks_uri (kid parameter). If the kid parameter is not provided, it is assumed that the TPP will use the unique key identifier (fingerprint) in requests, it is recommended to use x5t # 256.</p>
jwks_uri		Conditionally YES (unless jwks specified)	
scope	In accordance with RFC 7591 and RFC 7517	No	<p>One or more values from the list:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ais-accounts</li> <li>• ais</li> <li>• pis</li> </ul>

			If not provided, it is accepted on the basis of rights based on the roles described in the TPP certificate.
--	--	--	---

**Example of request:**

```
POST /register HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
{
  "software_statement": "
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJqd2tzIjpw7ImtleXMiOlt7Imt0eSI6IlBLSV
giLCJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJRTNqQ0NBQGFuQXdkJQkFnSUNBd0V3RFFZSktvWklodmNOQVFFRkJRQXdZe
kVMTUFR0ExVUVCaE1DVlZNVlp3PT0iLCJBQTRHOkFEdC9VRz12VUpTWlNXSTRPQj1MK0tYSVBx
ZUNnZllyeCtqRnoiXSwidXNlIjoiIjoiIjoiImtpZCI6ImtpZF9naXZlbn9ieV90cHAifV19LCJ
yZWVpcmlzIjpbImh0dHBzOi8vdHBwLmRvbWFpbi5leGFtcGxlL29hdXRoMiljYWxsYm
FjayJdfQ.J5ZWE6kKuIN2YxTUK14yyXWT4Ka72jQiXsx6BzxZrRM"
}
```

**Example of the software\_statement parameter:**

```
{
  "redirect_uris": [
    "https://client.example.org/callback",
    "https://client.example.org/callback2"
  ],
  "client_name": "My Money Planner",
  "logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/logo.png",
  "jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks",
  "client_desc": "One app to manage all your personal finances!",
  "sub": "PL-PFSA-43124312414",
  "sub_name": "Money Planning Sp. z o.o.",
  "scope": "ais ais-accounts"
}
```

**Positive response**

Proper registration of the client application is signalled by the HTTP 201 Created response code. The content of the response is a JSON document (Content-type: application / json), containing the fields presented below, however it is permissible to answer with any other fields, except that it is assumed that values not listed below should not be required to construct a correct API requests (should be purely informational).



**Response fields**

Fact ID	Meaning	Required	Comments
client_id	The unique identifier of the TPP application	No	<p>If the ASPSP does not support registration of more than one application per TPP, it is possible for it to omit the client_id value in the response.</p> <p>It is recommended that client_id should be equal to the TPP identifier for the default application of the given TPP (i.e. one for which the TPP did not provide specific application identification by indicating software_id). It also allows the use of such a value conventionally when ASPSP does not support registration of many applications.</p> <p>If the ASPSP returns the client_id value, the TPP should provide this value in the API requests that allow it (primarily the / authorize and / token methods)</p>
client_secret	Secret value used to authenticate the client application to the authorization server	No	Depending on the method of authorizing method / token calls, the value may or may not be provided. Unless the registration server returns client_secret, it should be given at the input of the / token method
api_key	Secret value used to identify the client application relative to the API	No	As long as the registration server returns api_key, it should be given as input in XS2A calls supporting it
jwks	A collection of keys (certificates - for asymmetric cryptography) that can	Conditionally YES (unless	It must contain a certificate (or place of certificate

	be used by ASPSP to sign an API response.	jwks_uri specified)	download) of the seal in accordance with ETSI TS 119 495, which can be used to sign the reply.
jwks_uri		Conditionally YES (unless jwks specified)	<p>ASPSP can optionally support for multiple certificates per TPP / application, in which case the collection may contain more than one seal certificate.</p> <p>While the ASPSP intends to use the "kid" parameter to identify the key used to sign the API response, the value of this parameter must be provided for each key located in jwks / jwks_uri (kid parameter). If the kid parameter is not given, it is assumed that ASPSP will use the unique key identifier (fingerprint) in the replies, it is recommended to use x5t # 256.</p>

**Example of response:**

HTTP/1.1 201 Created

Content-Type: application/json

Cache-Control: no-store

Pragma: no-cache

```
{
  "jwks": {
    "keys": [
      {
        "kty": "PKIX",
        "x5c": [
```

```

"XcFvvE3jCCA8ZasDDAgICAwEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwwYzELMAkGA1UE[int)
odpowiedz

    "xcAADt/UG9vUJSZSWI4OB9L+KX[YJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQA
  ],
  "use": "sign",
  "kid": "kid_given_by_bank"
}
]
},
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3"
}

```

### Negative response

The incorrect answer is signalled by a response code other than HTTP 201 Created. In the general case the registration error is signalled by codes:

- 401 - in the absence of confirmation of the identity of the client application or its issuer,
- 403 - in the event that the request concerns the granting of a scope of rights exceeding those allowed, e.g. resulting from regulatory authorization.

Negative response fields - consistent in structure with negative responses to requests to other XS2A interface methods.

## 6.6.2 Management of the JWS-SIGNATURE certificates

The PolishAPI standards requires that all requests and responses be signed in accordance with the JWS-SIGNATURE standard within the XS2A interface (ASPSP's side) and callback interface (TPP's side). This fact entails a necessity to manage the certificates, both in the context of signing the messages sent and their agreement and provision to the other side of the communication. This necessity is symmetrical, i.e. it concerns both the ASPSP and the TPP.

Considering the communication efficiency aspects in the XS2A and callback interfaces as well as the potential difficulties in the management of the encryption infrastructure related to the possibility of use of an unlimited number of certificates, the PolishAPI standard introduces the following requirement, which is an extension of the RFC 7515 standard in the context of the JWS-SIGNATURE header parameters:

- use of the 'kid' header parameter is required (extension of 4.1.4 of RFC 7515)
- use of the 'x5t#S256' header parameter is required (extension of 4.1.8 of RFC 7515)

The joint satisfaction of both above-mentioned requirements in the construction of each JWS-SIGNATURE allows the following:



- a) unambiguous identification of the certificate at the reader's side, its finding in the internal encryption infrastructure and its use to read the signature content
- b) skipping of the necessity to agree the certificate with regard to each message sent and received via the XS2A and callback interfaces

The introduction of the requirements described implies a necessity of a one-off prior or simultaneous (with regard to the message signed by JWS-SIGNATURE) agreement on the certificate between the communication parties. Considering the scarcity of this operation when compared to the number of messages signed using the certificate selected and, consequently, the low cost of its implementation, the PolishAPI standard does not impose any requirements in this regard but only determines the recommended implementations, i.e.:

- a) the use of the JWS-SIGNATURE header parameter called 'x5u' (see 4.1.5 of RFC 7515); it allows the URL to be included in the resource constituting a public key of the X.509 certificate, in the same message in which JWS-SIGNATURE was inserted for the first time using the given certificate
- b) procedure application based on the 'OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration' protocol (RFC 7591), allowing a prior (with regard to the actual communication using the XS2A or callback interfaces) agreement on the certificate between the parties, the / register method described in the PolishAPI specification can be used for this purpose - see section 6.6.1.

## 6.7 Protection against API Abuse

The API implementation should take into account the mechanisms of protection against excessive requests from the part of the users (both authorised and unauthorised ones), in particular those generated on purpose with the intention to render the resource unavailable (DoS/DDoS), by an application of mechanisms limiting the number of requests supported over a given time unit. The limit values should be determined after examination of the specific operational conditions. Limits of this kind should be parametrized. The count of the number of resource access requests should base on a key that unambiguously identifies the given TPP (the RequestHeader.tppID class) and the meters implemented per TPP on the server side. The limit excess must be signalled by HTTP message number 429 (Too Many Requests).

The security should be ensured on the basis of OWASP Guidelines - REST Security Cheat Sheet ([https://www.owasp.org/index.php/REST\\_Security\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/REST_Security_Cheat_Sheet)).

## 6.8 Audit Information Logging

It is recommended that the time sources for all the parties using the PolishAPI should be synchronized in order to ensure that the log entries have the correct time stamp.

The key business operation logging should ensure non-repudiation and integrity of entries by using the data from JWS Signature.

A log should contain necessary information that will allow a precise time analysis in case of an incident so that it would be possible to combine particular entries into a single transaction. The element combining particular entries may be, for example, an abbreviation from the authorisation token.

## 7 Technical Description of the Authentication and Authorisation Process

### 7.1 Scope and scope\_details Parameters

The scope parameter defines the following access scopes (corresponding to the consent granted by the PSU to the TPP with regard to the provision of services available via the XS2A interface). It is required to pass on only one of them:

- ais-accounts – the right to retrieve a list of the PSU's accounts;
- ais – the right to take information about one or more accounts indicated by the PSU;
- pis – the right to initiate a single payment or multiple payments in the form of a batch of transfers as well as to take information about the status of transactions and a batch of transfers initiated;

The detailed scope and conditions of services provided by the TPP on the basis of the above-mentioned rights were described in the form of a set of XS2A interface methods in the technical specification of the PolishAPI standard (Annex No. 1), separately for each of the AIS and PIS services.


The scope\_details parameter defines the time ranges, limitations and details of the given authorisation:

- a) as to the scope of resources which are made available (e.g. a list of accounts)
- b) time for which they are made available
- c) limit of the number of uses
- d) list of operations it concerns
- e) selected operation parameters, e.g. length of back history, transfer parameters etc.

A specification of the scope\_details parameter structure is given in Annex No. 1.

The above parameters are sent by the TPP as POST (due to the possible size of scope\_details) in the JSON format - encoded and signed using the JSON Web Signature in accordance with RFC 7515. The PolishAPI standard does not provide the possibility of providing two independent lists of privileges (privilege\_list) for the same account, as long as these lists contain the same privilege (eg the ability to display the history of booked transactions). Additionally, the standard assumes that the choice of an account by the user (PSU) on the ASPSP side, if it is enabled by ASPSP, cannot result in the appearance of two privilege lists containing the same privilege (with different parameters) for the same account - the authorization mechanism should take into account the need to limit the choices of PSUs in order to prevent this situation (eg by preventing the selection of certain accounts in the context of already made choices or validation that prevents acceptance of the consent so filled). The above limitation is necessary to ensure the unambiguous assignment of API calls to specific consent and to ensure the decidability of whether the request is authorized. Authentication Mechanism on the ASPSP's Side

The process of the PSU's authentication on the ASPSP's side was developed on the *authorization code* method as defined in the OAuth 2.0 standard. The high level business aspect of this mechanism was presented in the diagram below while a detailed procedure of the authentication process and of the process of obtaining authorization for the ASPSP's resources were described in Chapter [11.1](#).



**Figure 19: Authentication Mechanism on the ASPSP's Side**

Below are described the steps and changes with regard to the OAuth 2.0 standard implemented by the PolishAPI in relation with legal and security requirements.

## 7.2 Redirection from the TPP to the ASPSP

The redirection comprises the following parameters:

PARAMETER	REQUIRED	COMMENT
response_type	Required	'Code' value
client_id	Required	TPP's unique identifier
redirect_uri	required	
scope	Required	
scope_details	Required	
state	Required	A random value unique for the TPP – protection against the Cross-Site Request Forgery attack

### 7.2.1 PSU's authentication and authorisation

Performance on the ASPSP's side.

### 7.2.2 Reverse redirection of the PSU's browser to the TPP

When the PSU is granting an authorization for the TPP, the authorization server delivers this information to the TPP by sending a one-time authorization code, which means that it may be used by the TPP to obtain access to the ASPSP's resources (obtain an access token) exactly one time only. The code is sent within the request to redirect the PSU's browser to the redirect\_uri address (using the Content-Type parameter with the value of 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'). Additionally, the request may also contain the state parameter, which is required only if it was previously sent by the TPP in the authorization request.

A sample reverse redirection to the TPP after the PSU's authentication and the authorization of the TPP's access to the ASPSP's resources:

HTTP/1.1 302 Found

Location: `https://[redirect_uri]?code=[authorization_code]`

`&state=[state]`

where:

[redirect\_uri] – TPP-side address sent in the authorization request to which the PSU's browser is redirected after the process of that PSU's authentication and the authorization of access to the ASPSP's resources has been completed

[authorization\_code] – one-time authorization code confirming a correct authentication of the PSU and the PSU's grant of authorization for the TPP to access the ASPSP's resources

[state] – additional parameter allowing the adjustment of the authorization request with the redirection request after the completion of the PSU's authentication and after the grant by the PSU of authorization to the TPP to access the ASPSP's resources, used to prevent the 'cross-site request forgery' type attacks.

In case of an error that may occur at the ASPSP's side before or during the PSU's authentication process or resource access authorisation, the ASPSP must notify this fact to the TPP and indicate the type of extraordinary situation that caused this error. To this end, the callback request to redirect the PSU's browser to the redirect\_uri address as indicated by the TPP is used. The error type and related optional detailed information are included in the dedicated parameters located in the *Location* header of the redirection. The following parameters of the *Location* header are used to provide error information:

[error] – required parameter, its value defines the type of exceptional situation that caused the error; this parameter must assume one of the following dictionary values:

- invalid\_request – in case the request to redirect the PSU's browser to the ASPSP was erroneous, in particular when it was inconsistent with the address provided by the ASPSP in response to the /authorize request of the XS2A interface
- invalid\_authentication – in case the PSU was not able to terminate the ASPSP-side authentication process or there is a mismatch between the *psuIdentifierValue* parameter and the identity of the PSU authenticated
- context\_mismatch – in one of the following cases:
  - a. the authenticated PSU is not an individual client and the /authorize request does not specify a corporate context
  - b. the authenticated PSU is not a corporate client and the /authorize request indicates a corporate context
  - c. the context of the authenticated PSU is not compliant with the context provided in the /authorize request
  - d. the authenticated PSU has more than one context and the /authorize request does not indicate any context
- access\_denied – in case the PSU failed to authorise access for the TPP to its resources or such an authorization was not admitted by the ASPSP
- server\_error – in case of occurrence of an unexpected error resulting from the ASPSP's system failure which made it impossible to execute the PSU's authentication process and the resource access authorization process
- temporarily\_unavailable – in case the ASPSP-side system is temporarily unavailable, which makes it impossible to execute the PSU's authentication process and the resource access authorization process

[error\_description] – optional parameter, allowing for the provision of additional business information about error details

[state] – required parameter, the parameter value must be compliant with the value of the corresponding *state* parameter provided by the TPP in the authorize request.

The sample redirection sent by the ASPSP to provide information about the error:

HTTP/1.1 302 Found

Location: https://[redirect\_uri]?error= access\_denied&state=[state]

### 7.2.3 Token collected on the basis of the *Authorization Code*

PARAMETER	REQUIRED	COMMENT
grant_type	required	Value of the 'authorization_code'
Code	required	Compliant with the value given in step 7.2.3
redirect_uri	required	Value in accordance with the value in step 7.2.1
client_id	required	TPP's unique identifier

The TPP's authentication takes place on the basis of a certificate used for the TLS connection

Data returned, also allowing for the *scope\_details* field, containing details of consents granted by the PSU.

PARAMETER	REQUIRED	COMMENT
access_token	required	
token_type	required	
expires_in	required	
refresh_token	optional	
scope	optional	
scope_details	optional	

### 7.2.4 Consent Withdrawal

The consent withdrawal is made using the `/[version]/accounts/[version]/deleteConsent` method

### 7.2.5 Use of the *scope\_details* structure

- The one-time consent is supported using the *scopeUsageLimit* parameter.

## 7.3 Authentication Mechanism in an External Authorisation Tool (Decoupled)

The basis assumption of the PSU's authentication method described is the use of EAT (*External Authorization Tool*). It is a tool the minimum functionality of which is the capacity to carry out a strong authentication of the PSU within the understanding of the technical requirements of the PSD2 Directive. Additionally, EAT may constitute software that is external in relation to the ASPSP's technical infrastructure, which ensures a safe exchange of the authorization information.

A session between the TPP and the ASPSP, allowing for the strong authentication of the PSU and based on the *Decoupled* method in order to allow the TPP to use the XS2A interface, must be established in accordance with the process as described below. The process described was developed on the basis of the assumptions of the OAuth 2.0 protocol, which means that it uses the terms defined therein (e.g. ‘*authorization code*’, ‘*access token*’), but constitutes a separate way of gaining access to the XS2A interface in view of a lack of the use of redirections within the understanding of the http protocol, which are a mechanism this standard requires in the ‘Authorization Code Grant’ method. This approach was applied in order to ensure a coherence of the process of gaining access to the XS2A interface, irrespective of the PSU’s authentication method selected, and its objective is to facilitate integration activities related to the use of the XS2A interface by the TPP.

The TPP initiates a process of establishment of a session with the XS2A interface on the ASPSP’s side by calling the following XS2A interface method:

#### **POST /[VER\_A]/auth/[VER\_B]/authorizeExt**

The data sent in the request should be compliant with the XS2A interface technical specification as described in the Annex No. 1. It should be stressed that these parameters in an overwhelming majority are identical with the parameters of the request initiating a session with the XS2A interface using the ASPSP-side authentication mechanism as described in section 7.1.1. The most important parameters of that request were described in the table below.

PARAMETER	REQUIRED	COMMENT
response_type	Required	Constant value: code
eatCode	Required	One-time authorization code generated by the EAT tool
client_id	Required	TPP’s unique identifier
callbackURL	Required	Address of the callback function in the TPP’s interface to which the request containing a result of the PSU’s authentication will be sent
apiKey		A key securing and adjusting the response to the request send in the form of a callback function The key value has two functions: It constitutes a value identifying the ASPSP, on the basis of which the TPP determines whether or not the party sending the callback request is the party to which the original request was sent it allows one to match the callback request and the request sent originally by the TPP. Necessary in case of many requests sent to the ASPSP, responses to which are sent in the form of requests to the TPP’s callback interface The specific character of the provision of the apiKey attribute, both in the requests to the XS2A interface and to the callback interface, was described in the <i>swagger</i> format (version 2.0) in Annexes No. 1 and 2.
scope_details	Required	Parameter structure described in Annex No. 1

In result of the calling of this method and after a positive verification by the ASPSP’s of the TPP (Mutual TLS Authentication, client\_id verification) and after the confirmation of non-repudiation of the message received (JWS Signature), information on the confirmation of the process of the PSU’s authentication will be returned.

Notes:

The one-time authorization code, which is required as an input parameter of the authorizeExt method, must be generated by the EAT tool at the request of the PSU who has been earlier authenticated by that tool.

The PSU must previously activate access to the EAT tool in accordance with procedure developed and required by each of the ASPSPs.

The EAT tool ensures a procedure of strong authentication of the PSU. Optionally, the EAT also ensures the determination by the user of a source account (PIS) or an account/accounts covered by the consent (AIS), if this was not defined by the TPP in the call. The result of the SCA procedure completed must be sent as a message to the appropriate ASPSP. The way of provision to the ASPSP of the PSU's strong authentication result, obtained in the EAT tool is not discussed in this PolishAPI specification.

The result of the PSU's strong authentication procedure must be then provided by the ASPSP to the TPP using the following TPP-side callback interface method:

**[callbackURL]/[VER\_A]/auth/[VER\_B]/authorizeExtCallBack**

The scope of the request data was described in detail in Annex No. 2. The most important parameters of this request are:

PARAMETER	REQUIRED	COMMENT
authorized	Required	Logic tag designating the result of the PSU's strong authentication by the EAT tool. - true – the PSU has been authenticated - false – the PSU has not been authenticated
code	Conditional	It is a value of the authorization code within the understanding of the OAuth 2.0 standard and the 'authorization code' method generated by the ASPSP only and exclusively in result of the PSU's authentication in the EAT tool.

On the basis of the authorization code obtained in the previous step, the TPP should initiate an XS2A interface session by using the following method of this interface, in which one of the parameters required is an authorization code and the feedback is, among other things, the so-called 'Access token' (within the understanding of the OAuth 2.0 standard): **/[VER\_A]/auth/[VER\_B]/token**

The way this method is called is compliant with sec. 7.2.4, which describes the way of session initiation in the ASPSP-side PSU's authentication method. A detailed technical specification of this method is given in Annex No. 1.

## 7.4 Access token taking on the basis of the refresh token

The TPP may take a new access token using the refresh token (provided it has been issued). This situation may only take place in case of the AIS and PIS services for which the access token is required, i.e. in the following situations:

- The validity of the original access token expired and it is allowed to refresh it for an identical scope of consents

An initiation of a transfer or a batch of transfers was ordered using a selected PIS service method and it is necessary that the TPP obtained a new access token for another scope of consents, i.e. for the



purposes related to the verification of the status of a transfer or a batch of transfers ordered, without a renewed SCA procedure. Below is presented a TPP's request and a response from the ASPSP's server

PARAMETER	REQUIRED	COMMENT
grant_type	required	Value of 'refresh_token'
refresh_token	required	Compliant with the value provided by the ASPSP in step 7.2.4
scope	optional	The requested scope may not be larger than the one provided in step 7.2.4
scope_details	optional	The requested scope may not be larger than the one provided in step 7.2.4
is_user_session	optional	Defines whether or not the given session is related with an interaction with the PSU – true/false values. Expansion of the OAuth2 standard
user_ip	Required, if is_user_session=true	IP of the user's browser (information for fraud detection needs) Expansion of the OAuth2 standard
user_agent	Required, if is_user_session=true	Information concerning the version of the user's browser (information for fraud detection needs) Expansion of the OAuth2 standard

The response sent by the ASPSP is the same as in item 7.2.4

## 7.5 New access token taking on the basis of the exchange token

It is a method of establishment of a communications session with the XS2A interface the purpose of which is to provide an opportunity to exchange the access token without a necessity to re-run the SCA procedure in case of a change to the scope of consents pursuant to a scenario described in sec. 1.4.4.2.3 of the specification. This scenario assumes the access is obtained to a precisely defined subset of PSU's accounts as indicated by the PSU on the basis of a list of all its accounts with the given ASPSP, which was previously obtained by the TPP on the basis of another type of the PSU's consent and after the SCA procedure was carried out.

To effect this session establishment method, it is necessary to use a dedicated authorization method indicated in the 'grant\_type' attribute of the method/token with the 'exchange\_token' value, and the provision in the dedicated attribute of the same name (exchange\_token) of the value of access token obtained during the earlier request for the consent to take a list of accounts associated with a valid XS2A interface communications session.

Below is presented a TPP's request and a response from the ASPSP's server

PARAMETER	REQUIRED	COMMENT
grant_type	required	Value of 'exchange_token'
exchange_token	required	Access token obtained when requesting a consent to take a list of accounts
scope	optional	The scope requested must be narrowed down to the list of accounts selected by the PSU and to authorizations concerning the scope of information requested, e.g. account details, transaction history or transaction details
scope_details	optional	The scope requested must be narrowed down to the list of accounts selected by the PSU and to authorizations concerning the scope of information



		requested, e.g. account details, transaction history or transaction details
is_user_session	optional	Defines whether or not the given session is related with an interaction with the PSU – true/false values. Expansion of the OAuth2 standard
user_ip	Required, if is_user_session=true	IP of the user's browser (information for fraud detection needs) Expansion of the OAuth2 standard
user_agent	Required, if is_user_session=true	Information concerning the version of the user's browser (information for fraud detection needs) Expansion of the OAuth2 standard

The response sent by the ASPSP is the same as in item 7.2.4

## 8 Technical description of the PIS Service

This chapter constitutes a summary of the API specification in the swagger format defined in Annex No. 1 and Annex No. 2.

### 8.1 Diagram of Activity in the PIS Service




Figure 20: High-level diagram of activity in the PIS Service

### 8.2 XS2A Interface Request Structure

The table below contains basic information about all the PIS service methods of the XS2A interface, including the classes of objects of the cannon model of data provided in the request obtained in the responses.

INTERFACE METHOD	DESCRIPTION	KMD OBJECT CLASS
/payments/{version}/domestic	Initiates a domestic transfer	DomesticRequest/ AddPaymentResponse
/payments/{version}/EEA	Initiates a SEPA foreign transfer	EEARequest/ AddPaymentResponse
/payments/{version}/nonEEA	Initiates a non-SEPA foreign transfer	NonEEARequest / AddPaymentResponse
/payments/{version}/tax	Initiates a transfer to the tax office	TaxRequest / AddPaymentResponse
/payments/{version}/bundle	Initiates multiple transfers in the form of a batch	BundleRequest / BundleResponse
/payments/{version}/getPayment	Collects the transfer status	GetPaymentRequest/ GetPaymentResponse
/payments/{version}/getBundle	Retrieves the execution status of a batch of transfers	GetBundleRequest / GetBundleResponse
/payments/{version}/getMultiple Payments	Collects statuses of multiple payments. Calling does not require token reading.	GetMultiplePaymentsRequest / GetMultiplePaymentsResponse
/payments/{version}/cancelPayment	Cancels a transfer or a batch of transfers initiated	CancelPaymentsRequest/ CancelPaymentsResponse
/payments/{version}/recurring	Defines a new recurring payment	RecurringRequest/ RecurringResponse

/payments/{version}/getRecurringPayment	Retrieves the status of a recurring payment	GetRecurringPaymentRequest / GetRecurringPaymentResponse
/payments/{version}/cancelRecurringPayment	Allows a recurring payment cancellation	CancelRecurringPaymentRequest/ CancelRecurringPaymentResponse

### 8.3 Structure of call back interface requests - Callback

The PIS service specification comprises also a definition of Callback interface, owing to which the ASPSP has a possibility to notify the TPP, in an asynchronous way, about changes in the status of the payments and batches of payments initiated using the selected PIS service method of the XS2A interface. For this purpose, the following Callback interface methods were defined: paymentCallback, bundleCallback. A detailed technical specification of the Callback interface for the PIS service was defined in Annex No. 2, therefore the table below describes only basic elements of this interface.

INTERFACE METHOD	DESCRIPTION	KMD OBJECT CLASS
/payments/{version}/paymentCallback	Provides the status of performance of a single payment	PaymentCallbackRequest / CallbackResponse
/payments/{version}/bundleCallback	Provides the execution status of a batch of payments	BundleCallbackRequest / CallbackResponse
/payments/{version}/recurringPaymentCallback	Provides the status of a recurring payment	RecurringPaymentCallbackRequest / CallbackResponse

The method used to secure the API is the 'apiKey' type (<https://swagger.io/docs/specification/2-0/authentication/>) and, additionally, the fingerprint of the TPP's server certificate used to make the TLS connection of the Callback - sent in the keyID parameter - is verified. In the PISs called, the TPP transfers the apiKey value and the callbackURL used in the Callbacks to the ASPSP.

In case of a failed call, the TPP may renew it and the number of repeated calls will be defined by the ASPSP in the implementation documentation.

## 9 Technical description of the AIS Service

This chapter constitutes a summary of the API specification in the swagger format defined in Annex No. 1 and Annex No. 2.

### 9.1 Diagram of Activity in the AIS Service




Figure 21: High-level diagram of activity in the AIS Service

### 9.2 XS2A Interface Request Structure

The table below contains basic information about all the AIS service methods of the XS2A interface, including the classes of objects of the cannon model of data provided in the request obtained in the responses.

INTERFACE METHOD	DESCRIPTION	KMD OBJECT CLASS
/accounts/{version}/deleteConsent	Deletes/invalidates the consent	DeleteConsentRequest/ string
/accounts/{version}/getAccounts	Collects all accounts of the PSU	AccountsRequest/ AccountsResponse
/accounts/{version}/getAccount	Collects a single payment account	AccountInfoRequest/ AccountInfo
/accounts/{version}/getTransactionsDone	Collects all transactions made at the account	TransactionInfoRequest/ TransactionDoneInfoResponse
/accounts/{version}/getTransactionsPending	Collects all pending transactions at the account	TransactionInfoRequest/ TransactionPendingInfoResponse
/accounts/{version}/getTransactionsRejected	Collects all rejected transactions at the account	TransactionInfoRequest/ TransactionRejectedInfoResponse
/accounts/{version}/getTransactionsCancelled	Retrieves cancelled transactions at the account	TransactionInfoRequest/ TransactionsCancelledInfoResponse
/accounts/{version}/getTransactionsScheduled	Retrieves scheduled transactions at the account	TransactionInfoRequest/ TransactionsScheduledInfoResponse
/accounts/{version}/getHolds	Collects all account holds	TransactionInfoRequest/ HoldInfoResponse
/accounts/{version}/getTransaction	Collects data of a single	TransactionDetailRequest/

Detail	transaction/hold	TransactionDetailResponse
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### 9.3 Structure of call back interface requests - Callback

The AIS service specification comprises also a definition of Callback interface, owing to which the ASPSP has a possibility to provide to the TPP, in an asynchronous way, the information about the account, transactions and holds, the provision of which was requested by the TPP by calling the appropriate methods of the XS2A interface. To this end, a number of the Callback interface methods has been defined, a detailed technical specification of which was defined in Annex No. 2. The table below describes only the basic elements of the Callback interface for the AIS service.

INTERFACE METHOD	DESCRIPTION	KMD OBJECT CLASS
/accounts/{version}/accountsCallback	Provides information about details of the payment account selected	AccountsRequest / CallbackResponse
/accounts/{version}/transactionsDoneCallback	Provides information about transactions done for the given payment account	TransactionDoneInfoRequest / CallbackResponse
/accounts/{version}/transactionsPendingCallback	Provides information about pending transactions for the given payment account	TransactionPendingInfoRequest / CallbackResponse
/accounts/{version}/transactionsRejectedCallback	Provides information about rejected transactions for the given payment account	TransactionRejectedInfoRequest / CallbackResponse
/accounts/{version}/transactionsCancelledCallback	Provides information about cancelled transactions at the given payment account	TransactionCancelledInfoRequest / CallbackResponse
/accounts/{version}/transactionsScheduledCallback	Provides information about scheduled transactions at the given payment account	TransactionScheduledInfoRequest / CallbackResponse
/accounts/{version}/transactionsHoldCallback	Provides information about holds for the given payment account	HoldInfoRequest / CallbackResponse

## 10 Technical Description of the CAF Service

This chapter constitutes a summary of the API specification in the swagger format defined in Annex No. 1.

### 10.1 Diagram of Activity in the CAF Service




Figure 22: High-level diagram of activity in the CAF Service

### 10.2 XS2A Interface Request Structure (including a description of fields and information if required)

INTERFACE METHOD	DESCRIPTION	KMD OBJECT CLASS
/confirmation/{version}/getConfirmationOfFunds	Confirmation of fund availability	confirmationOfFundsRequest/ confirmationOfFundsResponse

## 11 Use of the XS2A interface methods and authorization services – sequence diagrams

The sequence diagrams presented in the UML notation describe interactions occurring between the PSU, the TPP, ASPSP-side systems and external systems which reflect the full scope of XS2A interface use scenarios, which constitutes the subject matter of the PolishAPI specification. The diagrams present only basic sequence and intervention paths leading to the achievement of the goal intended. This means that particular interactions may end in failure leading to error messages and codes returned by the XS2A interface methods or authorization service methods and which were not included in the diagrams for picture clarity. For the same reason, particular interactions contain only some parameters of requests and responses that are important for the correctness of the sequences presented (a full specification with all the parameters of requests and responses of the XS2A interface services and the authorization services was described in the technical specification of those interfaces).

The following abbreviations, acronyms and designations were used in the diagrams:

**ASPSP Auth** – a communications interface provided by the ASPSP, pursuant to the PolishAPI specification (AS - Authorization Service), the role of which is to provide methods to authorise the TPP's access to the XS2A interface services and, in effect, establishment of sessions with that interface.

**ASPSP XS2A** – a communications interface provided by the ASPSP, the role of which is to ensure the performance of business services described in the PolishAPI specification (AIS - Account Information Service, PIS – Payment Initiation Service i CAF – Confirmation of the Availability of Funds).

**EAT** – *External Authorization Tool*, a system ensuring the SCA, i.e. a procedure of strong authentication of the PSU.

**eatCode** – a one-time code generated in the EAT tool at the PSU's request used to authorise access to the XS2A as one of the SCA procedure factors.

**sync / async** – designation of the type of communication (synchronous, asynchronous), between the actors presented in the diagram.

**tpp\_redirect\_url** – a URL address to which the PSU's browser should be redirected after the completion of the process of the PSU's authentication and the TPP's access authorization to the ASPSP-side resources of that PSU, in case of the *Redirection* method of the PSU's authentication.

**auth\_redirect\_url** – an address to which the PSU's Internet browser should be redirected. In order to authenticate the PSU using the *Redirection method*.

**authorization\_code** – a one-time authorisation code which constitutes a confirmation of the TPP's authorization to access the PSU's resources.


**access\_token** – a token allowing access to the use of the XS2A interface services, described in more detail in sec. 5.3 [Definition of Access Token](#).

**callback\_url** – an address of the TPP-side callback interface indicating where the asynchronous responses should be sent.

**apiKey** – a type of token sent in the request in order to secure an asynchronous communication with the XS2A interface.

## 11.1 Establishment of an XS2A session with the ASPSP-side PSU's authentication

The diagram presents a communications sequence leading to the establishment of a session with the XS2A interface, allowing for the PSU's authentication using the *redirection* method as described in Chapter 7.1 [Authentication Mechanism on the ASPSP's Side](#)



**Figure 23: Establishment of an XS2A session – ASPSP-side authentication method**

### Description of interactions as per the sequence of their occurrence:

- 1: The PSU initiates the use of the selected XS2A interface service at the TPP's application side
- 2: The TPP presents a form with data required to identify the ASPSP, call an XS2A interface service and obtain access to that interface
- 3: The PSU inserts and confirms the data required in the TPP's form
- 4: The TPP requests authorisation of access to the XS2A interface by calling the following authorization service method:



**/[VER\_1]/auth/[VER\_2]/authorize**

One of the parameters of this method is an url address (`tpp_redirect_url`) redirecting to the TPP's interface after the completion of the procedure of the PSU's authentication and authorization of the TPP's access to the PSU's resources with the ASPSP.

5: The ASPSP validates the correctness of the authorization request received in terms of various aspects, including the correctness of signature, TPP's identity, compliance of the consents granted with the TPP's authorization

6: The ASPSP, in case of a positive outcome of the authorization request validation, returns a response containing an URL address to its own interface (`auth_redirect_url`) used for the PSU's authentication and authorization in the context of the request sent by the TPP

7: The TPP interprets the response from the ASPSP and returns a response to the PSU's browser in the form of a redirection to the interface of the ASPSP that obtained a response to the authorization request

8: The PSU's browser automatically redirects to the ASPSP's interface using the `auth_redirect_url` received

9: The ASPSP returns to the browser a page containing the PSU's authentication form

10: The PSU inserts authentication data to the form and the data, after confirmation by the PSU, are sent to the ASPSP

11: The ASPSP validates the correctness of the authentication data received as part of the SCA procedure

12: After the confirmation of the PSU's identity, the ASPSP returns to the browser a page containing a description of the scope of consents the TPP requested in order to perform the XS2A interface services, together with a form used to confirm the TPP's request, e.g. it presents a form with a list of PSU's account to be selected or with data of the transaction initiated.

13: The PSU accepts the TPP-requested consents by confirming the form presented, which is preceded by a potential selection of a subset of accounts (possible in case of selected XS2A interface services) and by provision of this information to the ASPSP

14: Having obtained the consent acceptances, the ASPSP generates and retains a one-time authorization code

15: The ASPSP returns to the browser a response in the form of redirection to the TPP's interface, i.e. to the url address of return to the TPP received in the authorization request (`tpp_redirect_url`), and sends the value of the one-time authorization code generated as the parameter of this response

16: The PSU's browser automatically redirects to the TPP's interface by means of the return url address received (`tpp_redirect_url`), together with the one-time authorization code

17: On the basis of the request received with the one-time authorization code, the TPP requests the ASPSP to start a session with the XS2A interface in the context of the authorization received from the PSU. To this end, the following authorization service method is called and one of the required elements of this method is a one-time authorization code (`authorization_code`):


**/[VER\_1]/auth/[VER\_2]/token**

18: The ASPSP validates the XS2A session establishment request received by verification of the authorization code received (`authorization_code`) and the data concerning the PSU's consents granted. After a positive verification, the ASPSP establishes a new session of the XS2A interface in result of which a unique access token (`access_token`) is generated.

19: The ASPSP returns a response to the session establishment request to the TPP, which contains, without limitation, the value of the access token generated, confirming thus the establishment of a session with the XS2A interface

## 11.2 XS2A session establishment with the PSU's authentication using an external authorization tool (*decoupled*)

The diagram presents a communications sequence leading to the establishment of a session with the XS2A interface, allowing for the PSU's authentication using the *decouple* method as described in Chapter 7.3 [Authentication Mechanism in an External Authorisation Tool \(Decoupled\)](#)



**Figure 24: Establishment of an XS2A session – authentication in an external authorization tool**

Description of interactions as per the sequence of their occurrence:

- 1: Via a browser or an application, the PSU sends the data to be authenticated in the EAT tool
- 2: The EAT tool verifies the authentication data and grants access to its interface to the PSU
- 3: The PSU requests that a one-time code be issued (eatCode)
- 4: The EAT tool generates a one-time code (eatCode)

- 5: The EAT tool returns the one-time code to the PSU's browser or application
- 6: The PSU initiates the use of the selected XS2A interface service at the TPP's application side
- 7: The TPP presents a form with data required to identify the ASPSP, call an XS2A interface service and obtain access to that interface (including, but not limited to, an insertion of the eatCode value)
- 8: The PSU inserts and confirms the data required in the TPP's form
- 9: The TPP requests authorisation of access to the XS2A interface by calling the following authorization service method:

**/[VER\_1]/auth/[VER\_2]/authorizeExt**

Due to the asynchronous character of the response to the request, among the parameters of the method, it is required to provide a url address (callback\_url) of the XS2A callback interface and a security token (apiKey). Furthermore, in order to obtain an authorization, it is required to provide the one-time code received from the EAT tool (eatCode).

- 10: The ASPSP validates the correctness of the authorization request received in terms of various aspects, including the correctness of signature, TPP's identity, compliance of the consents granted with the TPP's authorization
- 11: The ASPSP sends a request to the EAT tool in order to carry out the SCA procedure in relation with the PSU, including a verification of the correctness of the one-time code (eatCode) received from the PSU and generated by EAT. The request also provides business data defining the scope of the PSU's consent. Depending on the XS2A interface service, these may be, for example, a list of the PSU's accounts, data of the initiated payment or numbers of accounts for the transaction history retrieval.
- 12: The EAT tool verifies the correctness of the one-time code (eatCode) received from the ASPSP
- 13: EAT requests from the PSU a consent for the performance by the TPP of an XS2A interface service in the business scope as requested by that TPP, e.g. it presents a form with a list of PSU's accounts to select or data of the initiated transaction.
- 14: The PSU accepts the TPP-requested consents by confirming the form presented, which is preceded by a potential selection of a subset of accounts (possible in case of selected XS2A interface services)
- 15: The EAT tool requests that the PSU provided a second factor in order to complete the SCA procedure
- 16: The PSU executes a second factor in the EAT tool
- 17: The EAT tool verifies the correctness of the second factor provided by the PSU
- 18: The EAT notifies the ASPSP about the result of the SCA procedure carried out
- 19: In case of a positive result of the strong authentication of the PSU and the TPP's authorization to access the PSU's resources (including consents obtained from the PSU), the ASPSP generates and retains a one-time authorization code (authorization\_code)
- 20: The ASPSP notifies the TPP about the result of the request to authorize access to the PSU's resources by calling the following TPP-side callback interface method:

**/[VER\_1]/auth/[VER\_2]/authorizeExtCallBack**

In case the TPP has obtained authorization to access the PSU's resources, the request contains a one-time authorization code (authorization\_code).

21: On the basis of the request received with the one-time authorization code, the TPP requests the ASPSP to start a session with the XS2A interface in the context of the authorization received from the PSU. To this end, the following authorization service method is called and one of the required elements of this method is a one-time authorization code (authorization\_code):

**/[VER\_1]/auth/[VER\_2]/token**

22: The ASPSP validates the XS2A session establishment request received by verification of the authorization code received (authorization\_code) and the data concerning the PSU's consents granted. After a positive verification, the ASPSP establishes a new session of the XS2A interface in result of which a unique access token (access\_token) is generated.

23: The ASPSP returns a response to the session establishment request to the TPP, which contains, without limitation, the value of the access token generated, confirming thus the establishment of a session with the XS2A interface

### 11.3 Establishment of an XS2A session with the PSU's authentication using the *refresh token method*

The diagram presents a communications sequence leading to the establishment of a session with the XS2A interface, using the refresh token method.




Figure 25: XS2A session establishment – refresh token

Description of interactions as per the sequence of their occurrence:

1: The TPP sends a request to the ASPSP to start a session with the XS2A interface in the context of a session established earlier which was cancelled or in the context of a change necessity (consent scope narrowing down). The session is related to an additional token (refresh\_token), returned to the TPP during the original session establishment procedure. To this end, the TPP calls the following authorization service method (as described in 7.4), sending an additional token (refresh\_token):


**/[VER\_1]/auth/[VER\_2]/token**

2: The ASPSP validates the XS2A session establishment request received by verification of the additional token received (refresh\_token) and the data concerning the PSU's consents granted. After a positive verification, the ASPSP establishes a new XS2A interface session, in result of which a new unique access token (access\_token) is generated.

3: The ASPSP returns a response to the session establishment request to the TPP, which contains, without limitation, the value of the access token generated, renewing thus the session with the XS2A interface.

### 11.4 Establishment of an XS2A session with the PSU's authentication using the *exchange token method*

The diagram presents a communications sequence leading to the establishment of a session with the XS2A interface, using the exchange token method.



**Figure 26: XS2A session establishment – exchange token**

Description of interactions as per the sequence of their occurrence:

1: The PSU specifies the details of consents for the TPP by selecting a subset of accounts from the accounts previously retrieved by the TPP from the ASPSP, and by determining the scope of authorizations to the data related to those accounts, such as account details, account history and the time scope or transaction details.

2: The TPP sends a request to the ASPSP to start a session with the XS2A interface in the context of a previously established session that was established in order to retrieve a list of PSU's accounts and to which the access token (access\_token) returned to the TPP during the original session establishment procedure with a strong authorization of the PSU is related. To this end, the TPP calls the following authorization service method, providing the said access token and using the exchange\_token parameter:

**/[VER\_1]/auth/[VER\_2]/token**

The required parameters of that request are also the *scope* and *scope\_details* parameters, which must contain a detailed scope of consents, including the numbers of accounts selected by the PSU.

3: The ASPSP validates the XS2A session establishment request received by verification of the access token received (provided in the exchange\_token attribute) and the data concerning the PSU's consents granted. After a positive verification, the ASPSP establishes a new session of the XS2A interface in result of which a unique new access token (access\_token) is generated in the context of the new scope of consents.


4: The ASPSP returns a response to the session establishment request to the TPP, which contains, without limitation, the value of the access token generated, confirming thus the establishment of a new session with the XS2A interface.

## 11.5 XS2A Interface Method Calling with the Use of a Session

The diagram presents a communication sequence allowing one to call the XS2A interface services for which a valid session of that interface is required. The table below contains a list of methods within the framework of the AIS and PIS services, for which the sequence presented is obligatory.

<b>AIS</b>
/[VER_1]/accounts/[VER_2]/ getAccounts
/[VER_1]/accounts/[VER_2]/ getAccount
/[VER_1]/accounts/[VER_2]/ getTransactionsDone
/[VER_1]/accounts/[VER_2]/ getTransactionsPending
/[VER_1]/accounts/[VER_2]/ getTransactionsRejected
/[VER_1]/accounts/[VER_2]/ getTransactionsCancelled
/[VER_1]/accounts/[VER_2]/ getTransactionsScheduled
/[VER_1]/accounts/[VER_2]/ getHolds
/[VER_1]/accounts/[VER_2]/ getTransactionDetail
<b>PIS</b>
/[VER_1]/payments/[VER_2]/ domestic
/[VER_1]/payments/[VER_2]/ EEA
/[VER_1]/payments/[VER_2]/ nonEEA
/[VER_1]/payments/[VER_2]/ tax
/[VER_1]/payments/[VER_2]/ bundle
/[VER_1]/payments/[VER_2]/ getPayment
/[VER_1]/payments/[VER_2]/ getBundle
/[VER_1]/payments/[VER_2]/ cancelPayment
/[VER_1]/payments/[VER_2]/ recurring
/[VER_1]/payments/[VER_2]/ getRecurringPayment
/[VER_1]/payments/[VER_2]/ cancelRecurringPayment





**Figure 27: XS2A interface method calling with the use of a session**

Description of interactions as per the sequence of their occurrence:

- 1: The PSU initiates the use of the selected XS2A interface service at the TPP's application side
- 2: The TPP requests that a session with the XS2A interface be established. The session establishment procedure may be carried out on the basis of each one of the variants available, for which the sequence diagrams were described in the previous items of this chapter.
- 3: The ASPSP returns a response to the session establishment request to the TPP, which contains, without limitation, the value of the access token generated, confirming thus the establishment of a session with the XS2A interface

#### **Variant 1 – synchronous services of the XS2A interface**

- 4: The TPP sends a request to the XS2A interface in order to use a service of this interface selected by the PSU (one of the methods listed in the table above). In the request parameters, the input data required to perform the service and an access token (access\_token) are provided in order to verify the obtained authorization to use the service.

5: The ASPSP validates the correctness and validity of the access token obtained (access\_token) by means of an authorization service communication.

6: The ASPSP receives the access token validation result

7: In case of a positive result of the access token validation, the ASPSP returns the outcome of the XS2A service performance in the form of a response to the request sent by the TPP to the XS2A interface.

8: The TPP presents a result of the XS2A interface service performance to the PSU

#### **Variant 2 – asynchronous services of the XS2A interface**

9: The TPP sends a request to the XS2A interface in order to use a service of this interface selected by the PSU (one of the methods listed in the table above). The request parameters include input data - required to perform the service, an access token (access\_token) - required to verify the obtained authorization to perform the service, , and values of the callback\_url and apiKey parameters - required to send a response to the request in the form of a request to the TPP-side callback interface.

10: The ASPSP validates the correctness and validity of the access token obtained (access\_token) by means of an authorization service communication.

11: The ASPSP receives the access token validation result


12: In case of a positive result of the access token validation, the ASPSP returns the outcome of the XS2A service performance by sending a request to the callback interface of the TPP-side XS2A interface (to the address indicated in callback\_url).

13: The TPP presents a result of the XS2A interface service performance to the PSU

## 11.6 XS2A Interface Method Calling without the Use of a Session

The diagram presents a communication sequence allowing one to call the XS2A interface services for which a valid session of that interface is not required. The table below contains a list of methods within the framework of the AIS, PIS and CAF services, for which the sequence presented is obligatory.

<b>AIS</b>
/[VER_1]/accounts/[VER_2]/deleteConsent
<b>PIS</b>
/[VER_1]/payments/[VER_2]/getMultiplePayments
<b>CAF</b>
/[VER_1]/confirmation/[VER_2]/getConfirmationOfFunds



**Figure 28: XS2A interface method calling without the use of a session**

Description of interactions as per the sequence of their occurrence:

1: The PSU initiates the use of the selected XS2A interface service at the TPP's application side. This service does not require any session at the XS2A interface's side. The services of this type were listed in the table above.

### Variant 1 – synchronous services of the XS2A interface

2: The TPP sends a request to the XS2A interface in order to use a service of this interface selected by the PSU. The request parameters contain input data required to perform the service.

3: The ASPSP returns the outcome of the XS2A service performance in the form of a response to the request sent by the TPP to the XS2A interface.

4: The TPP presents a result of the XS2A interface service performance to the PSU

#### **Variant 2 – asynchronous services of the XS2A interface**

5: The TPP sends a request to the XS2A interface in order to use a service of this interface selected by the PSU. The request parameters include input data - required to perform the service, and values of the `callback_url` and `apiKey` parameters - required to send a response to the request in the form of a request to the TPP-side callback interface.

6: The ASPSP returns the outcome of the XS2A service performance by sending a request to the callback interface of the TPP-side XS2A interface (to the address indicated in `callback_url`).

7: The TPP presents a result of the XS2A interface service performance to the PSU

## 12 Error codes

STAGE	ERROR	HTTP CODE	HOW SUPPORTED
All	Incorrect request. No required headers or syntax errors in the request body provided.	400	TPP-side support. Change of the implementation of the XS2A interface client leading to the construction of requests compliant with the valid specification of that interface as published by the ASPSP.
	Incorrect verification of the TPP's identity. Resulting from the lack of TPP's certificate or no possibility to start a connection using the TLS protocol mutual authentication mechanism	401	TPP-side support. Verification of correctness and completeness of the certificate used to start connection with the XS2A interface.
	Sending requests which, as to their business scope, are not compliant with the consents obtained. E.g. an attempt to initiate a payment using an access token obtained on the basis of the PSU's consent to use the AIS service of the XS2A interface.	403	TPP-side support. Validation of implementation correctness. Sending requests which, as to their business scope, are compliant with the consents obtained.
	Inadmissible http protocol method has been used. Only the POST method is admissible.	405	TPP-side support. Change of implementation of the XS2A interface client leading to the construction of requests using the POST method.
	Incorrect accept header in the request (the server is not able to handle it correctly)	406	TPP-side support. Change of the implementation of the XS2A interface client leading to sending of requests with the correct <i>accept</i> header value, that are compliant with the valid specification of that interface as published by the ASPSP.
	An incorrect Content-Type header has been set in the request	415	TPP-side support. Change of the implementation of the XS2A interface client leading to sending of requests with a correct <i>Content-Type</i> header value that are compliant with the valid specification of that interface as published by the ASPSP.
	Errors in the validation of	422	TPP-side support. Change

	business data sent in the request body.		of the implementation of the XS2A interface client leading to sending of requests containing correct business data, that are compliant with the valid specification of that interface as published by the ASPSP.
	Internal error of the XS2A interface server of undisclosed origin	500	ASPSP-side support. Elimination of reasons underlying the error and restoration of the correct operation of the XS2A interface as soon as possible.
	XS2A interface doesn't support given functionality requested by TPP	501	TPP-side support. Given functionality requested by TPP is not supported by ASPSP, therefore TPP shouldn't repeat the request.
	The XS2A interface is temporarily unavailable due to increased server loading or maintenance work is in progress.	503	ASPSP-side support – notification sent to the TPP, as part of the response to the request, about the planned unavailability and restoration of the operation of the XS2A interface within the declared deadline. TPP-side support – re-sending of the request after the expiry of the ASPSP-declared deadline for the resumption of the XS2A interface operation. Notification sent to the PSU about a temporary unavailability of services related to the use of the XS2A interface.
Initiation of the authentication and authorization process (the /authorize and /authorizeExt methods)	Incorrect verification of the licence of the TPP that applies for a consent the scope of which is not compliant with the licence held.	403	TPP-side support. Verification of the licence obtained. Sending requests compliant with the licence held.
The PSU's authentication and authorization of access to the ASPSP's resources in the ASPSP's domain (after the PSU's browser redirection to the ASPSP's domain in the ASPSP-side authorization method)	A request to redirect the PSU's browser to the ASPSP was erroneous, in particular since it was inconsistent with the address provided by the ASPSP in response to the /authorize request of the XS2A interface	302	ASPSP-side support – redirection to the TPP's domain with information provided in the <i>Location</i> header about the error reason. TPP-side support - Verification of implementation of the

			XS2A interface client in order to improve the method of PSU's redirection to the ASPSP's domain.
	The PSU failed to authorise access for the TPP to its resources or such an authorization was not admitted by the ASPSP	302	ASPSP-side support – redirection to the TPP's domain with information provided in the <i>Location</i> header about the error reason. TPP-side support – transfer of information to the PSU about the result of authorization obtained from the ASPSP.
	The PSU was not able to terminate the ASPSP-side authentication process or there is a mismatch between the <i>psuIdentifierValue</i> parameter and the identity of the PSU authenticated	302	ASPSP-side support – redirection to the TPP's domain with information provided in the <i>Location</i> header about the error reason. TPP-side support – transfer of information to the PSU about the result of authentication of that PSU.
	The ASPSP identified errors during the verification of the context of the PSU authenticated	302	ASPSP-side support – redirection to the TPP's domain with information provided in the <i>Location</i> header about the error reason. TPP-side support - Verification of implementation of the XS2A interface client in order to improve the PSU authentication process or to collect additional correct information about the context from the PSU and renewal of the process of its authentication and authorization to the ASPSP's resources.
Start of the XS2A interface session (/token method)	The authorization code for <i>grant_type=authorization_code</i> is empty or syntactically incorrect.	400	TPP-side support - Verification of implementation of the XS2A interface client in order to improve the mechanism of session starting using the <i>grant_type=authorization_code</i> method.

	The authorization code for grant_type=authorization_code is invalid.	403	TPP-side support – reinitialisation of the process of the PSU's authentication and authorization of access to the ASPSP's resources in order to obtain a new authorization code.
	The value of refresh_token for grant_type=refresh_token is empty or syntactically incorrect.	400	TPP-side support - Verification of implementation of the XS2A interface client in order to improve the mechanism of session starting using the grant_type= refresh_token method.
	The value of refresh_token for grant_type=refresh_token has not allowed an identification of a valid ASPSP-side session of the XS2A interface.	403	TPP-side support – reinitialisation of the process of the PSU's authentication and authorization of access to the ASPSP's resources in order to establish a new XS2A interface session.
	The value of exchange_token for grant_type=exchange_token is empty or syntactically incorrect.	400	TPP-side support - Verification of implementation of the XS2A interface client in order to improve the mechanism of session starting using the grant_type= exchange_token method.
	The value of exchange_token for grant_type=exchange_token has not allowed an identification of a valid ASPSP-side session of the XS2A interface.	403	TPP-side support – reinitialisation of the process of the PSU's authentication and authorization of access to the ASPSP's resources in order to establish a new XS2A interface session.
	Incorrect verification of the licence of the TPP that applies for a consent the scope of which is not compliant with the licence held. The situation concerns incorrect values of the scope or scope_details parameters in a situation when it is reasonable that they should be filled in (e.g. obtaining a consent for a request concerning the status of an initiated payment or exchange consents to make more detailed requests concerning	403	TPP-side support - Verification of implementation of the XS2A interface client in order to improve the mechanism of session starting using a narrowed scope of consents.



	the AIS service) for the grant_type=exchange_token and grant_type=refresh_token methods.		
XS2A business service (AIS, PIS) calling	The ASPSP receives a request in which the access token value is empty or there is no <i>Authorization</i> header (does not concern the /deleteConsent and /getMultiplePayments methods)	401	TPP-side support - Verification of implementation of the XS2A interface client in order to improve the mechanisms of sending requests to the XS2A interface.
	The ASPSP receives a request with an access token that has expired	401	TPP-side support - token refreshing using the /token and grant_type=refresh_token methods.
	The ASPSP receives a request for which the client's consent (the XS2A session interface) has expired	403	TPP-side support - start of the process of the PSU's authentication and authorisation to the ASPSP's resources in order to refresh the consent or obtain a new one using the /authorize or /authorizeExt method.
	The ASPSP receives a request without JWS-SIGNATURE	400	TPP-side support - Verification of implementation of the XS2A interface client in order to improve the mechanisms of generating JWS-SIGNATURE and/or sending requests to the XS2A interface.
	The ASPSP receives a request with JWS-SIGNATURE which has not been validated correctly.	422	TPP-side support - Verification of implementation of the XS2A interface client in order to improve the mechanism of JWS-SIGNATURE generation. Verification of correctness and validity of the certificate (electronic stamp) used by the TPP to generate the signature.
	The ASPSP receives a request that cannot be handled due to the fact that the current limit of requests has been exceeded (concerns the AIS service and requests sent without the PSU's participation).	429	TPP-side support - re-sending of the request after the request counter value has been reset

In case of the 4xx and 5xx family errors, the business details describing the error causes may be described using the JSON structure called Error and sent back to the TPP in the response body.



In case of errors at the ASPSP side after the PSU's browser has been redirected to the ASPSP's domain (in the ASPSP-side authentication method), the business details describing the error causes may be described in the *Location* header of the redirection (code 302) to the TPP domain in accordance with the rules described in item 7.2.3 of the PolishAPI specification.

The business content of errors returned by the ASPSP and their additional identifiers will be described individually by each ASPSP in the XS2A interface specification basing on the PolishAPI standard, maintaining the extraordinary cases and HTTP error codes described.

## 13 Standard Implementation Recommendations

### 13.1 Timeout Support

Due to the timeout type events which may occur during the http request processing, the ASPSP must ensure uniqueness verification at the server layer at the requestId level. Having identified a non-uniqueness of the request, the ASPSP returns the 400.1 error (Request repeated).

The recommended timeout value is 30 seconds.

### 13.2 TPP verification

The TPP authentication should be made based on the communications certificate (tls) and signature certificate (JSON Web Signature), with a simultaneous verification whether or not the certificates correspond to the TPP's ID (tppld) in the ASPSP's database. The tppld value is determined by the ASPSP during the TPP technical registration; the suggested value is TPP's EUNIP .

### 13.3 Authorization server

It is recommended that in its configuration of the given client\_id, the ASPSP should have a list of redirect\_uri which may be used. Thus, the ASPSP will not redirect the client to an incorrect URL address which may be submitted by an untrusted party.

### 13.4 Fraud Prevention

In order to prevent potential frauds, a dedicated RequestHeader Class was implemented which is provided in each request and contains the following information about the PSU: IP address and userAgent. The structure will be useful for the ASPSP during the implementation of security mechanisms.

Additionally, it is recommended that the entities participating in the project exchanged information about suspected unauthorised transactions/compromised IPs etc.

## 14 List of Annexes

Annex No. 1: PolishAPI-ver3\_0.yaml

Annex No. 2: PolishAPI-CallBack-ver3\_0.yaml

